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THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL
The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa
One of the most significant yet least studied phenomena of postwar
international relations is the emergence of an extensive, ever-growing system
of global military assistance. In an age characterized by revolutionary
changes in all phases of war and diplomacy primary attention quite rightly
has been focused on the more general and radical developments of the time--
the uses and effects of nuclear weapons, the development and institutionaliza-
tion of far-reaching military alliances, the problems and pitfalls of Cold
War confrontation. When considered at all, the extension of military assis-
tance by the major powers has been thought of as merely a special case, a
secondary manifestation of these larger trends. Yet the nature and scope of
postwar military aid programs, particularly those extended to the developing
nations, have had significant consequences for the level of world armament
and tension, for the balance of both political and military power within
states, within regions, and between the major blocs.
The extension of military assistance, to be sure, is hardly a new
development. One need only glance over the diplomatic history of the 19th
and early 20th centuries to find instances in which powerful nations have
provided arms, equipment, training, and economiq subsidies to other nations
or groups fighting or fearing a foreign invasion or domestic insurgency.
Since 1945, however, military aid has taken on new, more complex and
far-reaching aspects. In quantitative terms there has been a tremendous
expansion in the scope of such aid directly paralleling the rise in the number
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of national entities. In every region of the world, but particularly in
the Middle East, in Latin America, and in Africa, more nations are now re-
ceiving more foreign military assistance and subsidies than ever before in
history.
Qualitatively the postwar changes have been of even greater import.
Arms assistance to the developing nations no longer appears to be a highly
volatile short- or even medium-term element of national policies. Although,
as with economic aid, some changes and cutbacks have been occasioned by
political developments, donor states now seem committed to relatively long-
term programs of increased formalization and institutionalization. Similarly,
the type and range of aid extended has shifted. Assistance programs,par-
ticularly those of the United States, now encompass not only the provision of
basic materiel and services necessary for the establishment and annual main-
tenance of armed forces but also the direction and planning of future im-
provement and development in military capabilities. Third, a major change in
emphasis seems to have taken place with respect to the goals of assistance
efforts. Few of the developing states are sought as present or potential
military allies capable of adding significantly to the armed strength of donor
nations against an actual or expected enemy. The primary purpose now seems
rather to develop military client states, to build up military-political
strongholds through which to preserve or upset regional balances, or to
maintain favored regimes against internal subversion or revolt.
In consequence any examination of arms control proposals with respect
to the developing areas must take into full consideration the role of
military assistance with respect not only to the absolute level of regional
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armament but also to the interests and commitments of both the aided nations
and the major powers. The attempt will be made here to sketch out a basis
for such consideration, to describe the nature and scope of military assis-
tance programs in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, and to suggest
the significant problems these programs pose for any future regional arms
control arrangements.
General Considerations
Before these regional descriptions can be fully understood and inter-
preted, however, consideration must first be given to some of the significant
difficulties and restrictions involved in the study of military aid. The
nature and magnitude of these problems are such that great care and circum-
spection must be exercised in drawing any firm conclusions.
The first and most obvious problem is that of restricted and/or in-
complete information. Military assistance has always been the most sensi-
tive area of foreign policy, one in which public announcement and debate
have been fraught with grave consequences for both donor and recipient
nations. In the postwar era this degree of sensitivity is equally, if not
more critical. Even in the West, where the practice of public accountabil-
ity brings somewhat more information to light, the pressure of competitive
co-existence, of "security" consciousness, and of instantaneous global com-
munication all tend to make military assistance one of the most accepted but
least discussed national policies.
Secondly, the amount and the type of information available about the
five major military aid programs differ widely. Due to annual Congressional
review, U.,S. military assistance efforts are relatively well publicized and
examined. Until recently, however, the amount of yearly grants to individual
nations was not made public: the magnitude and nature of aid to certain
states is still classified. The British government publishes some specific
figures but now summarizes many assistance allocations under two general
headings, aid for Commonwealth members and that for other states. Country
breakdowns for French and West German military assistance are almost non-
existent. Perhaps the most public data is available with respect to Sino-
Soviet military aid since at regular intervals the U.S. Department of State
publicizes both the amount and type of assistance extended by the bloc. This
information, however, is still classified for a period of time, and it cannot
always be considered complete.
Even when the precise amount of an assistance grant is known,
little can be said with surety about the specific type and character-
istics of granted arms.and equipment. Still less is (and seemingly can
be) known about the relative value or "price" ascribed by the donor nation
to various end items or technical services. To take only the best case,
the general principles of U.S. pricing policy have been officially reported.
In-service equipment is to be valued at its actual production cost (that
is, without procurement or warehousing charges) while those end items drawn
from "excess" or "obsolescent" stocks are to be priced at their "fair
value" (a price "not less than rehabilitation costs and scrap value or
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market value if ascertainable.")1 The valuation of individual equipment,
however, is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense and is not
made public.
A third difficulty of far greater complexity is the precise determin-
ation of what constitutes military assistance. There seems little question
that the direct provision of military goods and services should be so
classified; yet even such aid can have both a military and an economic cast.
In recent years the United States has stressed the contribution made to
economic development efforts by the use of military grants for "civic action"
projects. In the tradition of the Army Corps of Engineers certain equipment
and supported forces are programmed for developmental functions, road con-
struction, communications engineering, and public health improvement.
A second component of military aid would seem to be equipment sales
or loans, although these two factors are rarely considered in these terms.
In addition to their grant aid programs all Western donor states make cer-
tain quantities of new and obsolescent equipment available for sale to the
1 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Com-
mittee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program- Compilation
of Studies and Surveys, Study No. 10: The Military Assistance Program
(Washington, 1957), p. 1012. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations,
Hearings for FY 1963, p. 514. (In this paper, Hearings are identified by
the Fiscal Year of the program to which they relate, Prior to 1961 the gen-
eral title was the Mutual Security Act; since 1961 various titles have been
used, but the most common is the Foreign Assistance Act or, in the case of
the Appropriations Committees, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.)
2 Statement by General Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Congress, House of Repre-
sentatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 61.
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wealthier or more dissatisfied developing nations. Although available data
are minimal, prices reportedly range from those somewhat less than simple
production costs to those approximately equal to scrap value plus refitting
charges 0 3 The more infrequent loan arrangements usually involve little or
no costs to the recipient state beyond normal maintenance fees, full owner-
ship and refitting responsibilities remaining with the donor. I
Still greater definitional problems arise with respect to certain types
of military-tinged economic assistance, provided principally by the United
States and the United Kingdom. The first type, generally referred to as
"defense support," "budgetary assistance," or more recently as part of
"supporting assistance," has been extended to nations that in the donor's
opinion "do not have the economic means to support the sizeable armed forces ..
essential to their own and the common defense0 " Such assistance may take
the form of direct subsidies such as the British grant to Jordan, or of a
grant-commodity combination (the latter to be resold locally) as in the case
of U.S. supporting aid to Turkey. The specific uses of this aid are deter-
3 With respect to U.Sc sales programs, although there are occasional
reports in the press, the details and destinations of all sales are classi-
fied to avoid "embarrassing" the countries concerned. See U.S. Congress,
House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Hearings for FY 1963, p. 618.
Ibid.
5 U.S,, Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Hearings for FY 1964, p. 61. On the general problem of "what's in a label,"
see Edgar S. Furniss, Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance
(Princeton, 1957), p. 4; Amos A. Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of South-
east Asia (New York, 1962), p. T; Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin
America (New York, 1961), p. 66; and Charles Wolf, Foreign Aid: Theory and
Practice in Southeast Asia (Princeton, 1960), p. 188.
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mined jointly by the donor and recipient and vary greatly from country to
country. Examples culled from U.S. experience are to build roads, improve
sanitation facilities, and to raise the general level of literacy or technical
training, as well as to defray the costs of non-supported troops.
The second and more complex type is that entitled "special assistance,"
in the past a particular characteristic of U.S. programs. According to
official statements aid of this kind is provided for three purposes: first,
to maintain economic and political stability in countries where the donor
nation has strategic political interests; second, to secure access to over-
seas bases; and third, "to provide an alternative to excessive dependence on
Sino-Soviet aid." 6 In consequence the specific uses of such aid have often
been far more related to the economic development efforts of recipients than
to their military capabilities. Examples of aid employment range from the
financing of Congolese and Jordanian imports to the subsidizing of certain
Egyptian and Ethiopian educational programs.
Perhaps all that can be said about such aid forms is that they can and
are subsumed under the general rubric of military aid. It may be true, as
several observers contend, that, particularly in past U.S. programs, the
label "military" has been applied somewhat indiscriminately in an effort to
highlight the urgency of a particular request or to gain greater Congres-
sional and public approval. 7 Also, items such as base support are clearly
6 U.S. International Development Agency (AID), Proposed Mutual Defense
and Assistance Programs for FY 1964, p. 64.
7 Furniss, op. cit., p. 4.
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more related to the military programs of the aid-giver than to those of the
state aided and perhaps would be better included under the domestic military
budget.
However, it also seems c.ear that a large portion of this aid merely
exemplifies the acknowledged principle that in the long run a country's
capacity to defend itself against external attack or internal subversion is
inherently related to the state and level of its economic and social over-
head capital base. Budgetary support may permit a nation to pursue both
military security and social development more intensively; road construction
and public works may secure both improved military and civil transportation
and communication. For analytic clarity and greater public accountability
it undoubtedly would be preferable to draw more precise distinctions. Yet
the possible military as well as economic implications of such assistance
over a period of years cannot be denied, and they deserve consideration here
as a significant aspect of military assistance.
Perhaps the most difficult problem of all is to evaluate the effect of
military aid upon the recipient nation, Few analytic schemes of any type
have been advanced for assessing the role and value of military assistance.
Only two of these offer any possibility for rigorous quantitative examina-
tion: the models proposed by Charles Wolf, and the broad systems analysis
approach currently employed by the Department of Defense. 8 Both schemes,
however, contain significant limitations stemming from their policy orienta-
tion. First, their principal focus is on the value of assistance from the
8 Jordan, op. cit.
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viewpoint of the donor nation; only minimal consideration is devoted to its
implications for the aided state. Second, their effective use requires data
of a nature and extent not available or appropriate to a general overview of
military assistance patterns.
Qualitative analysis even at its best can provide few conclusive
answers in this regard. The ramifications of assistance are so complex and
the range of possible consequences so great that any attempt at relatively
precise estimation becomes enmeshed in a tangle of conflicting conditional
statements and highly qualified judgments. Moreover the restrictions of in-
complete information concerning both internal and regional conditions make
definitive evaluation extremely treacherous, if not impossible.
A few more specific considerations may indicate the difficulties in
assessing even the military effects of foreign military assistance. The
analyst's first task is to determine the extent to which a given quantity
and type of aid will strengthen or improve a national military capability.
Before such an analysis can be attempted, he must possess a relatively clear
picture of the nature and state of the military establishment in question.
Among other factors he must consider its level of armament and equipment,
its patterns of training and organization, its condition of physical and
morale preparedness.
The analyst then must consider whether aid is or will soon be appro-
priate to these conditions. Relevant questions might include these three:
Can the granted equipment be employed and maintained by national forces
given their physical abilities, their present skills, and their capacity
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for training in the immediate future? Is this equipment practicable or suit-
able for the particular environmental conditions? To what extent are addi-
tional supporting facilities or equipment required?
Still further complexities exist with respect to determining the im-
pact of assistance on a nation's capacity to counter external or internal
aggression. This task is perhaps easiest when the nation is or has been
engaged in action, when the effects of assistance are most readily apparent.
Even such situations present analytic difficulties. A small amount of
assistance at the proper moment may have disproportionately large effects,
resulting either from its scale-tipping properties or from its symbolic
representation of foreign political interest or commitment.
Assessment of effects in a time of tension or non-action is by far
the most difficult. Most simply stated, deterrence after all exists largely
in the eye of the beholder, in the "enemy's" estimate of the nation's
capacity and will to counter his attack or t9 inflict unacceptable damage.
Moreover assistance as a sign of foreign political commitment again may be a
crucial factor. Further, the nature and extent of assistance indeed may
exacerbate the tensions it has been designed to meet. It may occasion height-
ened military build-up by the other side--or allow for further repressive
measures resulting in increased internal agitation and disturbance.
Since the nature of these difficulties precludes the possibility of
any assessment of the impact of the various military assistance efforts, the
attempt here will be limited to a general discussion of the amount and type
of assistance provided by the major donor nations to the developing states
of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.
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II
The Regional Role of Military Assistance: The Middle East
Of the three regions under study the area in which postwar military
assistance has played the most significant role has been the Middle East, the
region bounded on the east by Pakistan and on the west by Egypt.9 Great
power strategic assistance to this area is hardly a postwar phenomenon; British
aid to dissident elements of the Ottoman Empire during World War I is just
one of the more well-known earlier examples. Three new developments, however,
have contributed to the increased importance and magnitude of present military
aid. First has been the rise of Arab nationalism, stressing de facto as
well as de jure independence, particularly in matters of foreign policy. A
second factor has been the emergence or rebirth of intra-regional conflicts
and arms races, Arab against Arab, and Arab against Israeli. Most signifi-
cant has been the third, the desire of both major power blocs to find indirect,
non-nuclear means to secure their strategic interests and influence in the
area.
All five leading donor nations provide military assistance to one or
more Middle Eastern states, the primary efforts being mounted by the United
9 It should be noted that the official definition of the Near East-
South Asia area includes several nations not included in this discussion:
Greece, Cyprus, India, Ceylon, and in the past, Sudan. According to the
definitions used in this paper, the Middle East includes Afghanistan, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Satudi Arabia, Syria,
Turkey, Yemen, Bahrein, Muscat, Qatar, and Trucial Oman.
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States, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the United Kingdom. Each aid program will
be examined in turn with respect to its historical development, its general
policy goals, and its specific country allocations.
U.S. Military Assistance
General considerations
Since 1945 the largest and most comprehensive program of military
assistance to the Middle East has been that provided by the United States.
Although not approaching the massive grants extended in Europe and the Far
East, U.S. efforts in this area have far surpassed those of any other nation
both in terms of the number of states aided and in the magnitude and dura-
tion of assistance efforts. It is also to be noted that they have greatly
surpassed U.S. programs in both Latin America and Africa.
U.S. aid involvement in this area dates from the immediate postwar
period and the first U.S. steps toward assuming Britain's traditional role
in the Middle East. Equipment and training aid was provided first in
limited quantities to Iran during Soviet occupation of its northern terri-
tories, and then in substantial amounts to Turkey in accordance with the
Truman Doctrine of 1947. The nature of the early Turkish program in fact
foreshadowed many later U.S. programs. Assistance was granted to deter,
rather than to meet, external aggression or internal subversion and was con-
cerned not only with modernizing the Turkish army but also with strengthen-
ing Turkey's economic base through budgetary assistance and public works
construction. In 1951 the number of aided countries was increased to three,
with the conclusion of a military assistance agreement with Sa'udi Arabia.
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Table I
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE
FY 1947-1963
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)
Region
Total FY
1947-1955
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Europe
Far East
Near East
and South
Asia
Latin
America
Africa
Other
*
2,019
1,504
46
4
301
686
227
261 639
686 657
377
665
352 521
364
564
255
544
782
448
371
849
411
238
685
443
12 28 56 52 67 54 72 71
*
* 9 12 13 25 35 33
683
15, 718
8,180
H4,933
482
138
927
* Data not available
** Discrepancies due to rounding, and de-obligation arrangements
Sources: Totals for FY 1947-1955, The New York Times, August 25, 1963, Section IV,
J 6 ; Annua1 Figures and final totals, International Cooperation Administration, The
Mutual Security Program: A Summary Presentation, for FYs 1959-1961, and International
Development Agency, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Program for FY 1964, pp.166 -
68.
Totals**
Table II
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U. S. DEFENSE SUPPORT/SPECIAL/SUPPORTING
-,CE FY 1949-1962
(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)
1953-57
3,087.3
2,993.8
FY 1958
92.7
687.3
FY 1959
96.8
565.1
FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 1962 Totals
51.4
550.1
69.3
530.0
43.7 14,903.6
293.4
Near East
and
South Asia
Latin
America
Africa
830.7 1,528.7
72.4
36.8
295- 5
31.4
30.7
379.8
34.8
68.8
Source: International Development Agency, The
Operations Report, December 31, 1962, P. 35.
341.7
29.6
123.7
315.8
59.0
104.2
285.5
95.2
55.7
3,977.7 f
322.4
419.8
Mutual Security Program:
mmmm omm am mmaam = mmm mm. amma .=.
Region
Europe
Far East
1949-52
11,462.4
444.3 6,063.9
The greatest expansion of the U.S. Middle Eastern effort came in the
period 1954-1958. First, the conclusion of the Southeast Asia (SEATO) and
Middle Eastern (Baghdad) defense treaties and bilateral U.S. agreements with
the regional Baghdad Pact states brought Iraq and Pakistan within the scope
of U.S. aid. As major allies each began receiving substantial quantities of
arms and training and military-economic support. In 1956 Afghanistan
became an aid recipient, limited amounts of special and training assistance
being extended in an effort to provide a counterweight to Soviet military
credits.
More significant expansion occurred after the events of Suez. The
rising tide of regional tension occasioned increased aid appropriations and
shipments for the Baghdad Pact nations and increased assurances of assistance
and support for "all" Middle Eastern states under the Eisenhower Doctrine of
early 1957. Only a month later Jordan began receiving at first emergency
and then continuing support for its armed forces and its economy in the face
of border threats and internal disturbances. The events of 1958 resulted in
further aid increases for Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. Although the Iraqi
program was terminated, another country, Lebanon, was added to the area
program.
Since 1958 the basic pattern of U.S. military assistance in the
Middle East has changed very little. From 1959 to 1962, some attempt was
made to counter Sino-Soviet efforts by extending limited quantities of special
assistance to their major client states--Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Revolutions in the latter three states in 1962-1963 led to further small-
scale programs of aid and training help.
Country programs
On first examination the specific country allocation of U.S. military
assistance seem to reflect a welter of different purposes and programs.
One approach to clarity lies in consideration of their relationship to the
major policy goals which the United States has pursued in the Middle East
since the end of World War II. As in other regions, the paramount U.S. aim
has been to secure the area against Soviet or Communist penetration, whether
sought by external attack or by internal subversion. A closely related
objective has been to promote the internal development and continuance of
regimes friendly to the West or, at the very least, to foster the growth of
internal political stability and a non-hostile atmosphere. The United States
also has tried to encourage the striking of a viable regional balance, to
discourage the spread or intensification of regional conflicts, both those
among Arab states and those between the Arabs and the Israeli.
Although, as in all areas, there have been some wide divergences between
principle and practice, the twelve country programs of U.S. military assis-
tance seemingly can be described and compared in terms of the particular
emphasis given one or more of these general policy goals. Four distinct and
quite different program types seem evident. The first is exemplified by
assistance efforts with respect to the allied periphery states, Turkey,
Pakistan, and Iran. The primary U.S. purpose here has been to develop and
strengthen military capabilities against the "double threat," against
direct Sino-Soviet attack and against subversion or infiltration across the
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common border. The amount of supporting assistance as well as direct
equipment/training grants received by these three nations has been massive,
far exceeding that to any other country or group of countries in the area.
Of all, the Turkish assistance program has been by far the largest in
terms not only of the thirteen-year total but also of annual aid appropria-
tions. This is hardly surprising in view of Turkey's membership in NATO
and its continuing need for substantial allied support to participate
effectively in the defense of NATO's right flank. Moreover, in the opinion
of many, Turkey is the keystone to Middle Eastern defense. It appears to
be the only nation in the arc with at least the potential military and
economic capacity necessary effectively to deter or resist direct Soviet
attack for any significant period of time.
Equipment and training assistance to Turkey has been directed primarily
toward modernizing and strengthening the Turkish armed forces. There have been
two distinct phases in the program, the first stressing the development of
army mobility and effectiveness. During the years from 1947 to 1957 Turkey re-
ceived substantial shipments of field weapons, artillery, tanks, trucks, and
other motor vehicles as well as significant grants for necessary military
training and base development. Construction also was begun on Turkish
10 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Hearings for FY 1962, p. 142.
11 The material discussed here is drawn from five major sources: U.S.
Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings for
FYs 1957-1965; U.S. International Cooperation Administration, The Mutual
Security Program: A Summary Presentation for FYs 1952-1959; U.S. Interna-
tional Development Agency, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs for
FY 1964; U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Se-
curity Program for FYs 1952-1961; and Jane's Fighting Ships (New York, 1959).
Table III
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING
ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST
FY 1950-1963
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)
Totals
FY 1950-1963 FY 1961 FY 1962
Afghanistan
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Pakistan
Sa'udi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
1.1
434.0
46.1
16.9
8.3
classified
classified
1,682.7
Area un-
distributed 508.7 77.5 55.4 49.4
* - less than $50,000.00
Source: U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual
Security Program for FY 1961, p. 15; International Development Agency,
Proposed Mutual Dcfense and Assistance Programs for ,Y .164, p. 177.
Country FY 1963
75.9
*
3.5
.2
-oo4
53.1
.036
3.9
.052
.126
69.7
.085
5.6
.087
I
1
1
I
1
I
I
1
I
I
1
1
I
1
I
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
180.3
.005
179.3 167.9
.010
Table IV
U.S. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST
FY 1952-1962
(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)
Totals
FY 1952-1957
Afghanistan
Iran
*
102
FY 1958
5.2
6-5*
30.9
.9
300
453
*
50.0
70.
FY 1959
16.1
3.0*
43.2
12.5
95.
100.
FY 1960
5.3
69.4
50.0
12.5
90.
82.
2.
FY 1961
9.2
22.0
45.0
95.6
90.0
.700
3.0
FY 1962
31.1
37.0
I-J
25.0
58.0
20.0
9.0
6.8
* - incomplete data
Sources: Totals from John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1958), p. 175;
annual figures from International Cooperation Administration, The Mutual Security Program:
Operations Report for FY 1959-1963, and International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual
Defense and Assistance Program for FY 1964.
Country
Jordan
Lebanon
Pakistan
Turkey
UAR Egypt
Syria
Yemen
1-MMMEMW 11M.-Mm wmppw- W - =I a ow a W-- -1w low"I"l-W W, I
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facilities for the production of small arms and ammunition. Although more
limited, some quantities of naval and air force equipment were delivered.
Under various agreements Turkey received several World War II vintage
destroyers and submarines and an undetermined number of conventional and
jet aircraft.1 2
The second phase of the Turkish program dates from 1957 and includes
several significant NATO-directed additions to the continued efforts for
army build-up. An unreported quantity of tactical nuclear weapons have been
shipped to Turkey, chiefly including the Honest John and other small surface-
to-surface missiles. Major aid for Turkish air defenses has been extended
in the form of newer attack aircraft, earlier F-86's being replaced by F-104
G's, and of the surface-to-air Nike and Hawk missile systems.13 Until
recent removal began, Turkey was also one of the two continental sites of
a number of Jupiter MRBM's.
Statements made during the Congressional presentation of the FY 1965
aid program, however, indicate that. renewed emphasis will be placed on
ground force development during the next two years.14 Both Secretary of
Defense McNamara and General. Lemnitzer expressed serious concern over the
deterioration of Turkish military capability, largely the result of equip-
12 Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit.., p. 219.
13 U.S. Departmentu of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual
Security Program for FY 1958, p. 25; International Development Agency,
Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Program, FY 1964, p. 731.
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Hearings for FY 1965, p. 88.
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ment defiixis and continuing maintenance problems. Over 60 per cent of
the total FY 1965 Turkish program is to be devoted to maintenance costs;
the remaining funds will be spent for ground equipment, trucks, tanks, and
armored carriers.15
The specific nature and goals of U.S. supporting assistance for Turkey
have varied widely. A major road construction project was completed in
1958: U.S. grants played a major role in the building of some 17,000 miles
of highway.16 A substantial proportion of all grants has been devoted to
financing needed commodity and capital goods import. Further specific uses
have included the support of agricultural experimentation, hydroelectric
projects, public health education, and resource development, especially coal
mining.
The Iranian and Pakistani programs have been somewhat different in
both purpose and scope. In Iran the prime focus of U.S. aid has been the
modernization and strengthening of the army. This has been done, however,
more for purposes of internal security than for even relatively self-suffi-
cient defense against external attack and has been carried out in coordina-
tion with programs focusing on the Iranian Gendarmerie.1 7 A substantial
15 Ibid., p. 500.
16 U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Se-
curity Program for FY 1957, p. 7.
17 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Com-
pilation of Studies and Surveys, Survey No. 1 (Norman Armour), Greece,
Turkey and Iran (Washington 1957), pp. 1204-05.
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proportion of total arms shipments has been in the form of ground weapons
(including some. anti-tank missiles), communications equipment, trucks, and
other motor vehicles. In recent years Iran has also received a number of
newer aircraft, particularly jets, and some air-to-air missiles.18
Assistance during FY 1965 will be used primarily for continued improvement
of air defense capabilities and extensive reorganization of existing ground
forces.19
The uses of U.S. supporting assistance in the past were as varied in
Iran as in Turkey. The largest portion of aid funds was directed toward
financing commodity imports and other forms of direct and indirect budgetary
assistance. Under the new policy instituted by President Kennedy, however,
this type of aid has been phased out during the past two years.
U.S. aid policy with respect to Pakistan has been formulated in some-
what broader terms in an effort to create at least a potentially effective
multi-service capability against external attack on the eastern edge of the
Northern Tier.2 0  Pakistan has been tendered large shipments of light tanks,
trucks, and communications equipment as well as numerous small arms and con-
ventional ground pieces. Through Britain the United States has also supplied
21
a number of naval vessels, including six refitted destroyers. I
18 U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Se-
curity Program for FY 1961, p. 16.
19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 90.o
20 Wolf, op. cit., p. 178.
21 Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit., p. 103.
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Major program emphasis, however, seems to have been focused on air
force development.. Although the specific details of all aid to Pakistan
are classified, Pakistan seems to have received at least three major ship-
ments of relatively new jet aircraft, including light bombers and some "high
performance" craft.2 2 Under the 1961-1962 program delivery was made of an
unreported number of air-to-air missiles.
The Sino-Indian border conflict has had some significant consequences
for both the nature and magnitude of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.
In an effort to calm Pakistani fears.about U.S. military aid to India and
to preserve Pakistan's "free world orientation" despite growing rapproche-
ment with Communist China, the United States not only made repeated asser-
tions of continued support through such emissaries as General Taylor and
George Ball, but also has programmed increased assistance for FY 1965-23
The primary focus of the new program will be the improvement of ground forces,
both in terms of training and equipment.
From FY 1955 through FY 1961 Pakistan also received a significant
amount of defense support aid. Although specific uses varied widely, the
primary objective of this aid was to provide budgetary support through the
financing of needed imports, particularly commodity goods. Phasing-down
and termination of this type of aid was effected during FY 1962 and FY 1963.
22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings for FY 1963, p. 731.
23 Ibid. for FY 1965, pp. 90, 500.
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Aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and Sa'udi Arabia represents a second type of
U.S. military assistance to the Middle East. The principal goal of these
programs is to aid pro-Western or generally friendly regimes in the mainten-
ance of internal stability, particularly with respect to the dangers of
subversion and infiltration. Assistance efforts therefore have been quite
limited in comparison with those in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and have been
directed more toward the training of existing forces and the provision of
smaller ground equipment.
The largest of the three programs has been that to Jordan, where
during the last five years the United States has begun to assume some of the
traditionally British responsibilities for military equipment, training, and
force support. Special crisis assistance was granted first in 1957 and then
on a larger scale in 1958, when King Hussein's rule was threatened by Syria
and Egypt. Quantities of small ground equipment were delivered, together with
some more sophisticated weapons, including twelve Hawker-Hunter aircraft
purchased from Great Britain. Extensive grants also were allocated for
budgetary support and the financing of various imports.
Continuing assistance since 1958 has reflected much the same pattern.
Direct equipment and training aid has been relatively limited in quantity and
has been directed mainly toward army maintenance and gradual modernization.
Far larger amounts have been appropriated for supporting assistance and have
been used chiefly to finance approximately one-half of Jordan's total foreign
imports.24 During the next two years, however, supporting assistance will be
24 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Hearings for FY 1963, p. 598.
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terminated and cooperative development programs will be substituted. 2 5
The military assistance program for Lebanon has been quite similar in
nature although more limited in scale. The crisis of 1958 resulted not
only in the landing of 14,000 U.S. troops but also in the extension of
financial and special equipment aid. Rushed arms shipments were comprised
mainly of small weapons for the then 8,000 man Lebanese armed forces but
also included a few aircraft and small naval craft.26 Since 1960, however,
Lebanon has received no further supporting assistance and only token
amounts of training and equipment assistance.
Very little has been revealed publicly about the specific scope or
nature of the program in Sa'udi Arabia since all of the relevant data have
been classified since its inception in 1951. Begun at the time of the
Dhahran airbase agreement, this assistance is perhaps better described
as indirect base support. Official explanation, however, has always
been that it is for internal security training purposes, and the program
has been continued even after the termination of the base agreement in
1962.27
25 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 44.
26 Ibid., Background Material on Mutual Defense and Development
Programs, Fiscal Year 1965 (Washington, 1964), p. 1245 (on force strength).
27 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Comm-
ittee, Hearings for FY 1963, p. 581.
-26-
Representative of a third type of aid program is the assistance
extended to Afghanistan and Yemen. Here the explicit purpose of aid
is to provide "an alternative to excessive dependence on Communist
28
aid." The largest proportion of grants has been in the form of support-
ing assistance for various requested direct military aid in the past,
only limited amounts have been allocated for direct equipment or train-
ing services.
Begun in 1956, the Afghanistan program has been the larger and
more comprehensive of the two. During the first years, only supporting
assistance was granted. Three projects absorbed most of these funds:
the establishment of Ariana, the Afghan national airline; the construc-
tion of Kandhar civil airport; and the development of a large road
system linking Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.
Direct military aid began in FY 1958 and generally has emphasized
training rather than equipment provision. A large percentage of total
allocations has been employed to bring Afghan officers to the United
States for special military education programs. The primary purpose
of this aid, however, is underscored by the fact that, while almost all
of Afghanistan's military aircraft and equipment are of Soviet origin,
its officers have received intensive flight and air-technical training
in U.S. jets and special English language and "military political" in-
29
struction.
28 U.S. International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual Defense
and Assistance Program for FY 1964, p. 60.
29 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Hearings for FY 1963, p. 582.
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Aid to Yemen, dating from FY 1959, has reflected the same pattern
of supporting assistance although in considerable smaller degree. Only in
FY 1963 was an extremely limited training-program initiated. All new
30
equipment aid, however, will end in FY 1965.
Although far less clearly, recent U.S. aid to Iraq might also be
considered under this general heading. Prior to 1958, Iraq, as a Baghdad
Pact member, received significant amounts of direct equipment assistance,
largely directed toward the strengthening of its 50,000 man army to meet
31
threats of border forays and internal subversion. After the July re-
volution the new regime immediately severed all U.S. assistance ties.
Small programs of direct and supporting aid, however, were resumed in
the early 1960's and have been increased slightly since the February
1963 revolution.
A fourth, mixed type of aid policy has been pursued by the United
States with respect to Egypt and Syria. Assistance to these states has
been minimal: since 1950 only extremely limited amounts of supporting
grants have been extended and almost no direct equipment aid. The scope
and character of this assistance has evidenced the conflict between two
major U.S. policy goals. On the one hand, the United States has attempted
to keep open at least a token support channel in opposition to massive
Soviet arms credit. On the other, however, a continuing policy principle
Ibid., Subcommittee on i'oreign Operations Appropriations,Hearings
for FY 1957,-p. 494.
31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program:
Compilation of Studies and Surveys: Survey No. 1: (Norman Armour), Greece,
Turkey and Iran, p. 1209.
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has been to discourage any further intensification of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Since the time of the Tripartite Declaration in 1950 the
United States has at least publicly declared its opposition "to the develop-
ment of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel" and has gener-
32
ally sought to avoid all but "balancing" involvement.
Assistance to Israel has also reflected the U.S. aim of at least
partial regional stabilization. Except during the first year of inde-
pendence Israel has received virtually no military aid grants in the
form of special or equipment support. At various times, however, in an
attempt to offset the increased level of Egyptian-Syrian armament, the
United States has concluded direct sales agreements with Israel for cer-
tain specific weapons. The Kennedy Administration permitted Israel to
purchase--at reduced costs--approximately $25 million in surface-to-air
33
Hawk missiles designed for anti-aircraft defense.
Sino-Soviet Military Assistance
General considerations
The second major source of military assistance to the Middle East
has been the Sino-Soviet bloc, principal donor states being the Soviet
Union itself and Czechoslovakia. Bloc military aid programs in this area
are considerably newer than those of the United States and the United
Kingdom. Prior to 1953 the bloc evidenced little interest in aid of any
32 Contained in documents collection in Carol A. Fisher and Fred
Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis (Syracuse, 1959), p. 126.
33 The New York Times, June 29, 1963
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type and maintained a relatively cool and distant approach to particular
34Middle Eastern states. With the launching of the new Soviet economic
offensive, however, new emphasis was placed on aid to the developing nations,
particularly the provision of military aid to the more advanced, "politi-
cally promising" states. A prime focus of attention was the Middle East,
arms agreements being concluded with Egypt in 1955, Syria, Afghanistan,
and Yemen in 1956, and Iraq in 1958.
Bloc aid programs seem to have differed from Western efforts in
several respects. First, Soviet arms assistance generally has not been
extended in the form of annual programmatic allocations. Although possi-
bilities for future review and revision exist, most assistance has been
tendered under direct bilateral agreements stipulating the provision of a
certain quantity of equipment, training, and maintenance assistance
over a specified time period. Also, only arms credits have been extended,
due with 2 to 3 per cent interest in from eight to ten years. Repayment
is not to be in cash but in basic raw materials and foodstuffs.
Perhaps the most significant difference lies in the seeming uniform
goals of bloc assistance. All five of the nations aided had repeatedly
sought and been refused Western, particularly U.S. aid. At the time
Soviet arms were offered each state was also party to a major conflict with
Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York,
1959), pp. 150-56.
35 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compila-
tion of Studies and Surveys: Study No. 10, The Military Assistance Program,
(Washington, 1957), p. 360.
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an important U.S. ally or with a pro-Western Middle Eastern regime.
Afghanistan had long been in dispute with Pakistan over Pushtoonistan;
Yemen, with the United Kingdom over the West Aden Protectorate. Alarmed
by the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt and Syria also had just
suffered the Gaza and Lake Tiberias setbacks in their continuing campaign
against Israel. Iraq's new regime had renounced the royal alliance with
Jordan, assistance ties with the United States, and later its commitment to
the Baghdad Pact.
Country programs
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise scope and nature
of Soviet military assistance efforts, since the details of arms agreements
are secret and total amounts are officially reported simply as commercial
transactions.- Western reports of Soviet efforts vary widely as to the
value and type of equipment provided. Included in Table V are two esti-
mates; those made public by the Department of State in June of 1961, and
those made more recently by an Israeli journalist.
Aid to Egypt has been the most extensive and diversified of all
Soviet military assistance. During the first year of the Soviet-Egyptian
agreement Egypt reportedly received between $200-$225 million worth of
36 Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid (New York, 1958), p. 48.
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Table V - A
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS
T1ROUGH JUNE 1961
(In Millions of Dollars)
Military
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Syria
Yemen
107
315
188
128
27
Regional Totals
Global Totals
955
1,793
Economic
217
624
216
178
44
2,379
4,092
Source: Cited in U.S. Congress, House of Representative, Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings
for FY 1962, p. 703.
Table V - B
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ
UNDER AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED 1955-1963
(In Millions of Dollars)
1955-1956
180Egypt
Iraq
Syria
1957-1958
150
110
1959-1960
120
*
1961-1962 1963-1964
170
*
220
180
* incomplete data
promised, but status unclear
Source: Leo Heiman, "Moscow's Export Arsenal," East Europe, May 1964.
Totals
370
290
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direct equipment aid. 3 7 Specific end items delivered were alleged to include
approximately 150 MIG 15's and 17's, 40 11-28 medium bombers, 300 T-34 heavy
tanks, 2 destroyers, 6 submarines, and a "substantial" assortment of rocket-
launchers, bazookas, artillery, and armor pieces. The Suez campaign, re-
sulted in the loss of much of this equipment. Approximately one third to one
half of the aircraft and one half of the ground equipment were destroyed or
captured.38
With few exceptions direct arms aid since 1957 has followed approximately
the same patterns. During 1958-1960 Egypt received further shipment of
similar or more modern equipment: field weapons, tanks, including some
heavier T-54's, W-class submarines, Skoda-class destroyers, and airplanes, a
sizeable number being M-lT jet fighters. The most important equipment inno-
vations have come in the last two years with the delivery of TU 16 bombers,
MIG 21 supersonic jets, and an unknown number of Soviet-made rockets and
missiles, most recently the SA-2 surface-to-air missile. 9
Perhaps the most significant aspects of Soviet military aid have been
those programs designed to develop Egyptian production facilities, aid
generally provided under the heading of economic and technical assistance.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compila-
tion of Studies and Surveys: Study No. 8, (The Council for Economic and
Industry Research, Inc.) Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc
and Their Implications for the United States, p. 73.
38 R. K. Ramazani, "Soviet Military Assistance to the Uncommitted
Countries," Midwest Journal of Political Science, November 1959, p. 366.
The New York Times, July 24, 1963; Leo Heiman, "Moscow's Export
Arsenal," East Europe, May 1964, pp. 3-7.
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Since 1956 the Soviet Union has participated in the establishment of an
experimental nuclear reactor and has provided training for Egyptian nuclear
physicists in Moscow. Two years ago Egypt's first munitions factory was
completed and reportedly it has been supplying arms to both Egyptian forces
and to revolutionary groups in certain other Middle Eastern and African
40
states. Recently Egyptian leaders have boasted that Egypt now has the
capacity to oroduce limited quantities of jet aircraft, submarines, and
41
missiles. While some Western doubts exist as to the validity of these
claims, it is certain that such present or potential programs would have
necessitated substantial amounts of Soviet equipment, technical services,
and financial support.
Past Soviet bloc assistance to Iraq and Syria has been somewhat simi-
lar in nature, although not in extent, to the direct equipment aid
tendered Egypt. Between 1958 to 1963, the Qasir government concluded
three two-year arms agreements with the Soviet Union for a total of $370
million in equipment and training aid.42 Included in the end-item shipments
were some 300 T-34 and IS-3 tanks, 100 T-54 tanks, 140 M-17 jets, and 38
SA-2 anti-aircraft guided missile launchers. Over 1,200 Iraqi officers and
technicians attended schools and training courses in the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia, and at East German naval bases.
40 Arnold Rivkin, Africa and the West (London, 1962), p. 94, and
statements by Senators Javits and Keating U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 347
41 The New York Times, July 24, 1963, May 8, 1964.
42 Heiman, op.cit., pp.9-11.
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After the Ba'th revolt in 1963, however, all direct Soviet military
aid was terminated, including the provision of training services and main-
tenance equipment for weapons already delivered. Although some barter
trade still exists between Iraq and three Soviet satellites- -Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and East Germany--it is unlikely that major Soviet assistance
would be resumed so long as the Iraqi government continues its drive
against Iraqi Communists and so long as the Soviet government continues
its assistance and support of the Kurdish rebels. 4 3
Bloc assistance tc Syria has been characterized by two stages.
Prior to union with Egypt, Syria received equipment credits totaling
$110 million, primarily for the purchase of 80 MIG-17 jets, 200 tanks,
and sufficient artillery equipment for three regiments. During the Egyp-
tian-Syrian Union, however, Syria was forced to divert much of the more
advanced weaponry received, including two W-class submarines, to Egypt.
Equipment deliveries to Syria were resumed in early 1962, substan-
tial quantities of aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery being made avail-
able. An agreement for 1963-1964 assistance was signed, providing for $180
million worth of MIG-21 jets, T-54 tanks, and SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles.
It is not yet clear, however, when or if delivery will be made to the new
Ba'th regime.45
The New York Times, September 7, 1963
Heiman, op. cit., p. 9
45 Ibid.
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Afghanistan since 1956 has been the recipient of increasing amounts
of Soviet bloc military assistance. Arms have come from five bloc states;
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have extended the largest credits, with
supplementary amounts being supplied by East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.
The primary focus of equipment aid has been the development of an
Afghan air capability to oppose that established in Pakistan through U.S.
assistance. Under the initial agreement the Soviet Union provided 11 MIG-15's,
2 helicopters, and a "gift" transport plane together with the Soviet per-
sonnel necessary to fly and maintain them. During the past eight years
the total number of delivered aircraft has risen to 100, of which approxi-
mately 70 MIG-15's and 17's are now in operation and being flown by Soviet-
trained Afghan pilots. Other equipment aid has been chiefly in the form
of small arms and artillery pieces.
A portion of bloc economic and technical assistance credits has also
been used for military support purposes. In 1956, the Soviet Union under-
took reconstruction of Kabul airport and later began construction of a
second airfield. A continuing program has also been focused on develop-
ment and maintenance of roads linking Afghanistan's major cities with the
Soviet border.4 8
46 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 65.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Comm-
ittee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation
of Studies and Surveys: Study No. 8 (The Council for Economic and Industry
Research, Inc.) Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and
Their Implications for the United States, p. 651.
48
U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Sec-
urity Program for FY 1961, p. 18.
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The smallest amount of past Soviet military assistance has been that
extended to Yemen under an agreement concluded with the royalist government
in 1956. During the first two years the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
provided at least seven shiploads of arms, primarily comprised of tanks,
self-propelled guns, and other small field equipment. Relations with the
regime, however, became somewhat strained after 1960, and no further arms
deliveries were reported.
The Soviet position vis-a-vis the new Yemeni regime is reported to be
considerably more favorable. Since the September 1962 revolution there
have been repeated reports of new arms shipments provided both directly by
the Soviet Union and indirectly through Egypt, and under the new Soviet-
Yemen pact, promises of more to come. The Soviet Union also has concluded
a major agreement with the new government concerning the construction of a
large jet airport near Sana. Long sought by the Soviets, this field reported-
ly will be designed to allow Soviet aircraft easier access to African and
Latin American air routes .49
British Military Assistance
General considerations
The third major source of postwar military assistance to the Middle
East has been the United Kingdom. Although considerably smaller in size
and narrower in scope, British programs have most resembled those of the
United States in the extension of both equipment/training aid and military-
economic supporting assistance. Also particularly since Suez, the two
49The New York Times, July 30, 1963.
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states have pursued similar assistance goals, the strengthening of friendly
governments against both external and internal threat and the preservation
of at least some state of regional stability and balance.
Britain's present role in Middle Eastern military affairs is vastly
different from that which it played in the past. During the 19th century
British aid and forces were used to support and protect the Ottoman
Empire against both Russian expansionism and French imperialism. After
the Turkish Armistice in 1918 the United Kingdom emerged as the paramount
power in the Middle East, the acknowledged protector of the region as well
as the holder of three major mandates. British forces based at Suez and
British military commands in most of the states dealt with all problems of
external defense and any serious internal disorders. Even as progressive
degrees of independence were granted its mandates, indigenous armies gen-
erally were still equipped and trained by Britain and functioned, often under
direct British command, only as police or auxiliary forces.50
Significantly restricted by postwar economic conditions and the rise
of Arab nationalism, Britain at present provides exclusive assistance
only to its traditional protectorates, the small states and sheikdoms on
the Persian Gulf littoral. Moreover, since 1956 all other assistance
efforts--in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey--have been carried out in
coordination with the United States. In the latter three countries, British
aid has assumed an explicitly complementary or supplementary function.
50 John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, (New York,
1961). p. 67.
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Country programs
The precise details of British military assistance programs are parti-
cularly difficult to ascertain, their nature and scope being rarely dis-
cussed as openly as similar U.S. efforts. Consequently the attempt here will
be only to describe general aspects with particular emphasis on the more
publicly-reported post-Suez programs .51
By far the principal recipient of military aid, both pre- and post-
Suez has been Jordan, long a major concern of British Middle Eastern policy.
British assistance has been extended in two distinct phases. From 1946 to
1956, the United Kingdom was almost the exclusive source of all aid to
Jordan, which was beset by economic and military problems resulting from
the creation of Israel. Direct equipment and training aid was provided for
the strengthened Arab Legion, and increasing amounts of budgetary support
for the financing of imports and the stabilization of currency.52 All
aid ceased, however, in 1956, when King Hussein severed the aid ties and
expelled the remaining British officers from the country.
No further assistance was provided until the crisis of 1958 when Anglo-
Jordanian relations were resumed and special emergency aid in the form of
troops, equipment, and grants was extended. Although the size of British
grant aid is substantially larger than before, Britain now shares almost
equally with the United States the responsibility for further strengthening
Jordanian forces and providing annual budgetary subsidies.
Material for this discussion is drawn largely from House of Commons,
Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts for FYs 1952-1962 and Civil Estimates
for FYs 1963-1964.
52 Sir John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (London, 1959), p.375.
Table VI
BRITISH MILITARY AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST
(In Thousands of Pounds)
Country
milit.
Jordan
supp.
Lebanon milit.
Sultanate milit.
of Muscat
and Oman supp.
Totals
FY 1959 FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 1962 FY 1963 FY 1964 FY 1959-1964
50.
2,200.
300.
400.
34.5
510.
20.
20.
693.
576.4
2,500.
33.
646.
,36o.
636.5
1,500. 1,500.
1,986.4
10,570.
68.
5.3
947.
290.
1,058. 1,270.
290.
1,335.
1,382.3
5,703.
Persian Gulf
Security
Force milit.
Turkey milit.
milit.
CENTO
supp.
SEATO supp.
All military
assistance -
worldwide
393.5 451.
2,170.
330.
300.
439.5
710.
413.
milit = military
Sources: House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations
Estimates for FYs 1959-1964, II.
supp,
Accounts and Civil
578. 648.7 795.
717.9
485.
1,092.
1,170.
363.
85.
50.
118.0
90.7
40.
95.
3,958.2
3,779.5
363.
2,049.5
1,328.
381.5
115.9
43.
98.570.
= support
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Similar crisis assistance was provided to Lebanon from 1958 to 1960.
British aid in this respect was explicitly supplementary to that extended
by the United States and largely took the form of training and maintenance
aid to the Lebanese air force.5 3
Britain also has extended a significant amount of military assistance
to its allies in the CENTO and SEATO Pacts . In recent years, Turkey has
been the recipient of several British warships. Some have been provided on
loan; others have been directly transferred with major refitting costs borne
by Britain. Aid to the CENTO nations in aggregate now takes two forms:
supporting aid, principally technical assistance provided since 1958; and
direct military aid, begun only in 1963. British support for SEATO member
states has been only in the form of technical project aid.
Few data are available about British military aid to a former Baghdad
Pact member, Iraq. Under a treaty concluded in 1955, on the same day as the
Pact itself, Britain agreed to furnish Iraq with equipment and training for
its airforce in return for continued use of certain Iraqi bases. Shortly
after the 1958 revolution and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi arms
agreement Britain announced that it would continue to provide Iraq with
some direct military assistance.5 5 Neither the precise nature of this aid
53 House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil
Estimates for FYs 1959-1961, II, Section C.
54 John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1958), p. 4T.
55 Marlow, op.cit.,, pp. 185-187.
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nor the amount given has been reported. A similar announcement was made
after the revolution of 1963, specifically with respect to the delivery of 50
Hawk Hunters promised the former regime.56
Some British grant aid has also been provided to the oil-rich Persian
gulf bheikdoms, long under the direct protection of British troops. The
principal semi-dependent recipient has been the Sultanate of Oman and
Muscat, which has been supplied both equipment aid for its British-trained
forces and what might be called "supporting assistance" toward the "capital
and recurrent costs of the Sultan's armed forces."57 Substantial aid has
also been directed toward the strengthening and improvement of the Persian
Gulf Security Forces and of Kuwait's small forces.
Although principally relevant to an earlier era, the role of British
assistance in the Arab-Israeli conflict also deserves some mention.
During the first phase of the period from 1947 to 1955, British arms assist-
ance in the form both o- ,rant, and sales went primarily to Egypt and the
Arab states; some newly supplied British arms were used by Arab League
forces in 1948.58
From the time of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 until 1955,
Britain and the United States attempted at least in part to play a balancing,
restraining role in the context of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Similar or
56The New York Times, October 6, 1963.
5 THouse of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts for FY 1961,
ii, p. 62.
58 Christopher Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy Since the Second
World War (London, 1961), p. 132.
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identical end-items were sold to the two major disputants, as for example,
the sale to both countries of two World War II vintage destroyers in 1955.59
Since the time of Suez Britain's role in supplying arms to either
Egypt or Israel has been relatively minimal. Israel has purchased some
further equipment, including two S-class submarines delivered in 1960.60
There have been no reports of further aid or sales to Egypt.
Other Military Assistance - French and West German
Information with respect to the nature and the extent of French and
Western German military assistance programs is extremely limited and in the
latter case only recently made public. All that is known is that both
nations are providing some amount of military assistance to Israel.
French military aid to the Israelis began in the early 1950's but
did not assume significant proportions until September, 1955.61 There is
considerable evidence to demonstrate extensive French assistance at the
time of Suez and the close coordination of Israeli and French forces, parti-
cularly during the Sinai campaign.62 Since 1956, however, available data
suggest only that France is the main supplier of Israeli defense equipment,
including a number of jet Super Mysteres, Super-Cysteres, and promised
Mirages.6 3 France is also reported to be aiding Israel in nuclear research
and in the development of the thermal reactor at Dimona.
59 Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit., pp. 164 and 217.
60 Laqueur, op. cit., 221.
61 Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit., p. 217.
62 Laqueur, op. cit., p. 201
63 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 104-07; Heiman, op. cit., p. 8.
West Germany is reported to be providing only training to Israeli
soldiers in Bundesrepublik camps and special centers. A recent statement
by a Bundestag member denied that any armaments had been sent to Israel
itself and asserted that West German efforts were being carried on with
the knowledge and at least qualified approval of the United States and the
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other NATO allies.
At the request of the United States, West Germany has also assumed
significant responsibility for assistance to Turkish ground forces
committed to NATO. The specific nature of this aid has not been disclosed,
although of the $40 million allocated for foreign military assistance during
1962 and 1963, West Germany reportedly extended some $30 million to Greece
and Turkey.65
Note must also be made of non-governmental German involvement in
Middle Eastern military affairs, namely, the reported participation of
some 24 German scientists in UAR missile-development programs. Pressured
by Israeli protests and expressions of concern from other states, the West
German government revealed that 500 German scientists and technicians were
currently employed by the Nasser government (350 in the aircraft industry
and 150 in rocket programs) none of whom were nuclear scientists.U6
Statement of Harns Merten, quoted in The New York Times, June 16, 1963.
65 Ibid., June 8, 1963
66 Ibid., May 5, 1964
Although the Erhard government has repeatedly asserted its non-involvement in
this matter, it is now attempting to frame legislation which would hinder, if
not prohibit, such individual participation in the future.
III I
The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Latin America
Military aid to Latin America constitutes the second largest component
of postwar aid to the three developing regions under study--in quantity far
less than that to the Middle East, but far surpassing that to Africa. Until
recently, however, due to a number of significant, situational differences,
the precise role that military aid played in Latin American military affairs
was a unique one and almost beyond comparison.
During the postwar period Latin America, long under the exclusive pro-
tection of the United States, was largely a backwater of international
military relations. In Latin America, unlike the Middle East, any threat of
direct attack from outside the region was generally considered a highly im-
probable event; few of the nineteen republics made any substantial contingency
plans or preparations. In comparison to both the Middle East and Africa, the
degree of direct intra-regional conflict was also quite limited. Although
there were numerous border disturbances, inter-nation disputes, and quasi-
arms races, no state prepared on any large scale for local wars. 6 7 The major
military threats in Latin America were those of internal revolt and insurrec-
tion. These frequent insurgencies, however, were generally the result of
67 Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 211.
exclusively internal political disputes in which the armed forces them-
selves often took a leading, partisan part.
Events of the past three years have added new, more comparable di-
mensions to the role of military assistance in Latin America. The
emergence of Cuba, first as a nation substantially aided by the Soviet
Union and then as the locale for Soviet bases, has forcefully injected
the problems of Cold War military confrontation and competition into the
area. Moreover a new aspect of intra-regional tension and conflict is
evidenced by Cuba's relations with its neighbors, both directly and by
virtue of its position as an exporter of revolution.
Examination here will focus mainly on the long-standing U.S. programs
and the changes in scope and extent that these have undergone. The dis-
cussion of Soviet efforts in Cuba and through Cuba in the rest of the hemi-
sphere will of necessity be general due to the lack of definite public
information. Limited attention also will be given to the role of other
aid donors in armament sales to Latin American states.
U.S. Military Assistance
General considerations
By all standards the most significant military assistance to Latin
America has been that extended by the United States, for most of the post-
war period the exclusive source of all grant aid to the area. Annual pro-
grams have been small, generally averaging less than 5 per cent of all U.S.
military aid efforts, and have been diffused widely among the Latin
American Republics. Their significance for postwar "arms and politics"
in Latin America, however, has been far disproportionate to their absolute
size.
U.S. military assistance programs actually date from World War II
and before. During the 1920's and 1930's the United States extended arms
purchase privileges and military missions to a number of Latin American
states in an effort to offset European, particularly Axis, military and
political influence. World War II occasioned further U.S. assistance:
approximately $5C0 million was provided to eighteen states in the form of
Lend-Lease grants, direct equipment aid, and economic support.6 8  A special
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 to deal with
broad organizational questions of hemispheric defense, the problems of
equipment standardization, and the channelling of American monies.
Despite Truman Administration efforts, the first major postwar pro-
grams of aid were not begun until after the start of the Korean hostilities.
Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 aid was to be granted to Latin
America "in accordance with defense plans which require the recipient nations
to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemi-
sphere."6 9 Subject to the general coordination of the revived IADB, these
68 William A. Brown and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance
(Washington, 1953), p. T.
69 Quoted in Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 199.
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plans were to provide for the development of collective strength -Against
external attack and internal aggression, for the protection of vital sea
lanes and communication lines, and for the availability of strategic bases
and access to essential materials. Nations specifically allied with the
United States for these purposes were to receive direct equipment and
training assistance; all Rio Treaty signatories were to be permitted to
purchase U.S. equipment on a reimbursable basis.
From 1952 to 1958, U.S. assistance to Latin America was carried on
with little or no change in this general framework. Twelve Latin American
nations became eligible for direct equipment aid under bilateral Mutual
Defense Assistance (MDA) agreements: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
in 1952; Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay in 1953; and Nic-
aragua, Guatamala, Haiti, and Honduras in 1954 and 1955. During the
period the United States provided approximately $195 million in diversi-
fied equipment and training assistance and transferred some 81 ships to
Latin American countries under grants or low-cost reimbursable sales. 0
The principal focus of this assistance was to strengthen and modernize the
twenty army batallions, the twenty-one air squadrons, and the assorted
naval units which the twelve states had committed for potential hemi-
spheric defense functions.
70 Robert D. Tomasek, "Defense of the Western Hemisphere," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, November 1959, p. 393.
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In the late 1950's and particularly after 1959, the scope and nature
of U.S. military assistance to Latin America underwent substantial
change and redefinition. Some revisions were the result of Congressional
action. In 1958 the Morse Amendment was passed, placing renewed emphasis
on the "hemispheric defense" function of grant arms and equipment and
seeking to prevent their use in civil strife or in regional conflicts .
More far-reaching have been the decisions of Congress in placing ceilings
on military aid funds for Latin America. For FY 1960, appropriations for
equipment aid were not to exceed $67 million (the amount allocated in 1
FY 1959); for FY 1961, $57.5 million and beginning in FY 1964, $55 million
annually.T2
Other changes reflected U.S. efforts to secure and demonstrate hemi- I
spheric solidarity and strength in the face of the Cuban threat. The
scope of the military aid program was extended by special training aid
agreements to include the remaining eight Latin American states: Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
The most significant changes, however, were those made in the general
objectives of military assistance programs in the area. The underlying
reasons for these changes, as well as their general dimensions, are per-
haps most forcefully set forth in Summary Presentation for FY 1964:
J. Lloyd Mecham. The United States and Inter-American Security
(Austin, 1961), p. 337.
72 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 403.
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Military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented
to hemispheric defense prior to 1960. As it became clear
that there was no threat of significant external aggression,
emphasis shifted to strengthening internal security capabil-
ities for use against Castro-Communist activities or other in-
ternal disruptions or banditry, and to civic action projects
designed to further economic and social development. Limited
assistance is also given for such activities as harbor defense,
coastal patrol, and surveillance. 7 3
Secretary of State Rusk, speaking recently in more qualified tones, also
mentioned the effects of "the rapid development of sophisticated weapons
systems" and "the change in the world system" on previously-held concepts
of hemispheric security.74
Consequent to these goal changes the specific nature of aid programs
has changed radically. Concern for internal stability has dictated greater
emphasis on developing and equipping small mobile forces trained in counter-
insurgency techniques. Equipment provided is now substantially more in the
form of small ground weapons, communications equipment, transport vehicles,
and small naval craft. Civic action programs are supported by the provision
of men, equipment, and training. Since FY 1961 eight new engineering battalions
and seventeen new medical units have been established and equipped and have
been employed as much as 80 per cent of time-in-service for community better-
ment projects.75 In total, internal security assistance and civic action
U.S. International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Assistance Program for FY 1964, p. 60.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings for FY 1964, p. 20.
75 Ibid., p. 915.
support are said to account for 90-95 per cent of all military aid allo-
cations in Latin America.76
Country programs
As has been suggested above, U.S. military assistance programs for
individual Latin American countries bear a far greater resemblance to
one another than in the case with respect to the Middle Eastern and African
programs. Some distinctions of course do exist: aid is greater to countries
with which MDA agreements have been concluded than to those receiving only
training assistance and also to countries with large diversified forces than
to those with relatively small single-arm military establishments. On the
whole, however, the degree of similarity is strong and permits of further
general comment. 7 7
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of military aid to Latin
America has been its relatively limited scale, particularly in contrast
to that of the Middle Eastern program. Of the nineteen past or present re-
cipients of U.S. military assistance, only one, Brazil, has received over
$7O million in aid, and this as a result of a base rights agreement. Five of
the twelve MDA allies as well as all of the eight training agreement states I
Ibid., Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, p. 62.
Material discussed here drawn largely from U.S. Department of State,
Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for FYs 1952-1961;
Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit.; Mecham, op. cit; and Tomasek, op. cit.
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have received less than $10 million in aid. On the whole, over the
thirteen year period, U.S. assistance appropriations have averaged 5
per cent or less of total Latin American military budgets; in no country
have "local military units receiving U.S. military aid constituted more
than 1/6th of total personnel strength."78
Moreover there seems also to have been some effort to maintain a
general regional balance in aid grants. States traditionally concerned
with each other's military power have not received widely differing amounts
of assistance. In the case of Chile and Peru the difference has been only
$13 million over the period, although economic factors have resulted in a
somewhat greater discrepancy--$25 million--between aid to two present
border disputants, Peru and Ecuador.
Further differences between Latin American programs and those in
other regions lie in the specific type of aid extended. Supporting assist-
ance has been of minimal military importance in Latin America. No Latin
American Republic received defense support; under bilateral assistance
agreements each country has been responsible for organization and operation-
al support of those of its forces receiving equipment or training aid.
Special assistance has usually assumed the form of emergency non-military
aid, as, for example, relief for flood or earthquake damage or temporary
budgetary difficulties.
78 U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual
Security Program for FY 1960, p. 34.
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Table VII
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAIMED U.S. TRAINING
PROJECTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1963
(in number of trainees)
Training in Overseas
Region the U.S. Schools Total
Europe 2,518 535 3,053
Near East and
South Asia 4,686 428 5,1114
Latin America 3,044 2,642 5,506
Africa 485 77 562
Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for FY 1963,
pp. 414-15.
Training assistance, particularly since 1959, has received special
emphasis in Latin American programs. The presence of both military training
missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in a number of
countries has been for the purpose of increased local training and super-
vision. The percentage of Latin American officers and enlisted men parti-
cipating in special training programs outside their own countries is far
greater than Latin America's proportionate share of the military assistance
budget. In the eafly 1960's this disproportion reached a new high, due parti-
cularly to expanded U.S. training programs for members of Latin American armed
forces. As of March 15, 1964, 21,825 Latin American military personnel
I
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had received training in the Canal Zone; 19,019 in the United States
itself. 9
A third unique feature of U.S. military aid policy toward Latin
America has been the relative importance of direct reimbursable equipment
sales. By the end of FY 1959 Latin American countries had been allowed
to purchase approximately $140 million of excess military equipment, a
quite substantial figure when compared with that for other regions.
With respect to direct sales also some efforts have been made to
preserve inter-nation balance. Perhaps the first example of this was
the sale in 1951 of two destroyers to each of the ABC nations, long con-
cerned with the level of one another's naval armament. Similar balanced
sales to these three countries were made in 1959.
Turning to the specific programs for the twelve MDA allied states, by
far the largest recipient has been Brazil, one of the few Latin American
countries with the beginnings of naval and air forces as well as a relatively
large army. Assistance to Brazil has been characterized by two distinct
phases. From 1952 to 1957, Brazil received relatively small amounts of equip-
ment and training aid, directed principally toward strengthening its naval
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 407.
8o U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual
Security Program for FY 1952, p. 8.
ad air position vis-a-vis Argentina as well as toward improving its
coastal defense capability. 81 Several World War II vintage naval vessels
were transferred or sold at low prices; a quantity of aircraft and air
training equipment was provided to supplement goods produced locally.
A significant change in the scope and nature of aid to Brazil took
place in 1957, after the conclusion of the Fernando de Noronha agreement.
In return for providing a missile tracking site, Brazil demanded and re-
ceived substantial aid increases, in the form of enlarged grants and
expanded purchase credits. Since 1957 primary emphasis has again been
placed on naval and air equipment. Four destroyers, four submarines, and
a number of jet fighters have been directly supplied, and other naval
craft and planes have been loaned or sold.83
Armament status vis-a-vis other Latin American states has also been
a major factor in the provision of military aid to two other coastal de-
fense states, Chile and Uruguay. One of Chile's main concerns has been
its relative naval strength with respect to that of Argentina and Peru.
In 1951, Chile purchased two destroyers for this purpose, and in 1959 it
received two additional destroyers and two submarines under MDA grants.
81 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 388.
82 The New York Times, February 10, 1957
83 Tomasek, op. cit., pp. 387-89; Campbell, op. cit., p. 121.
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Table VIII
ANNUAL MILITARY SALES BY CLASSIFICATION
(in millions of dollars)
Class FY53 FY54 FY55 FY56 FY57 FY58
NATO 2.6 6-5 4.1 7.9 18.7 24.1
Defense
Support
Nations 8.9 3.4 1.0 2.4 .8 .8
Latin
America 9.7 8.7 12.3 8.4 13.2 18.1
Others 19.7 51.8 231.8 102.1 100.5 34.6
Source: President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assis-
tance Program (The Draper Committee) Composite Report, Vol. I, p. 142.
Recent programs, however, have been directed more toward the provision of
aircraft and transport vehicles and the construction of roads and other
social capital projects.84 Assistance to Uruguay has been somewhat similar
in nature but considerably smaller in scale.
Peru and Ecuador have also been the recipients of substantial pro-
portions of all military aid to Latin America. The Peruvian program in
fact has been the third largest in size, again with considerable amounts
allocated for the strengthening and modernization of naval and air forces.
84
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for FY1963,p.621.
I
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Table IX
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE
TO LATIN AMERICAN STATES
FY 1950-FY 1963
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriation)
Total
FY1950-1960Country Fy 1961 Fy 1962 Fy 1963
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Undistributed
2.2
.9
121.6
40.8
26.0
1.4
1.7
24.2
3.8
1.4
22.8
8.3
9.8
.5
4.1
13.0
8.9
10.0
.5
10.6
.1
6.2
17.0
.2
2.3
.9
2.3
4.0
4.4
.8
1.5
2.2
2.1
2.52.9
1.2
1.0
.3
.3
.5
.1
.3
.6
.1
.1
3.9
1.5
.5
1.3
30.8
21.8
.8
.5
10.0
1.8
.9
1.7
.5
1.4
8.5
2.2
1.3
2.2
.050
2.1
Source: U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security
Program for FY 1961, p. 18; International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual
Defense and Assistance Program for FY 1964, p. 178.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Since 1952, Peru has been given a number of naval vessels including
three destroyer escorts, four submarines, and smaller coastal craft,
and has received an unreported quantity of aircraft and air training
equipment beyond the twelve well-publicized F-86's.85 Aid to Ecuador
has been considerably less diversified and smaller in scale due, at
least according to official explanations, to U.S. concerns about the in-
ability of its economy to absorb equipment.
The course of military assistance programs in Colombia has been
markedly uneven. Relatively large amounts of aid were granted from 1951
to 1953, the period during which a Colombian unit was fighting with
United Nations forces in Korea. When it became apparent that U.S. equip-
ment was being used to solidify the rule of strong man Pinilla, however,
arms shipments were severely limited in nature.86 With the restoration
of civilian governmant and especially since the start of the Alliance of
Progress, assistance programs were once again resumed and substantially
increased in size. In'the last two years large sums have been allocated
for road construction and other civic action projects.
Similar changes have characterized the aid program for the Domini-
can Republic. Aid efforts began in 1952 and were greatly expanded after
the conclusion of a missile tracking station agreement with Trujillo.
85 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 386.
86 Ibid., p. 382.
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When the use of granted equipment for repressive action against the
civilian population became dramatically evident, assistance was first
suspended in 1958 and finally terminated in 1960. The overthrow of the
Trujillo regime and the establishment of a more democratically-oriented
junta brought resumption of aid grants, first on a small scale in FY 1962
and in considerably larger amounts in FY 1963. The anti-Bosch coup in
September, 1963 brought still another change; equipment aid was again
halted and the 51-man MAAG group withdrawn. Limited assistance of an un-
reported nature was restored in January, 1964,87
The United States has terminated all assistance to two of the
original twelve N@A allies. The case of Cuba is so well known as to
necessitate little comment. All shipments of military equipment to the
Batista government were halted in March 1958, and an embargo was placed
on all private U.S. shipments. Assistance to the Duvalier regime in
Haiti at first restricted, then suspended, and finally terminated in late
July of this year. Programmed allocations for Haiti have been redistri-
buted among several other Latin American states for civic action programs.8
Small and quite diversified aid has been extended to the remaining
two MDA allies, Nicaragua and Guatamala. Perhaps the only aspects of note
were the efforts at the time of the Guatamalan crisis in 1954.
8T The New York Times, January 27, 1964.
88 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affaris, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 921.
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Nicaragua, under Anastasio Somoza, received increased deliveries of
ground equipment, including some tanks and armored vehicles which were
deployed along the Guatamalan border. After the overthrow of the Arbenz
regime Guatamala's new government received arms for stabilization functions.
Assistance to the remaining eight Latin American Republics largely
has assumed the form of shipments of training equipment and the assign-
ment of training personnel. The largest amounts to date have gone to
Bolivia, where some of the funds have also been used for road construc-
tion and maintenance, and to Argentina, which has recently purchased
several submarines and a number of jet fighters.
Soviet Military Assistance
Soviet military assistance has played a major role in the Latin
American military situation only since 1960, when large scale aid was first
extended to Cuba. Since little public information is available concerning
the precise nature and scope of Soviet aid and the arrangements under
which it has been granted, only a general comment can be made here.
Prior to the initiation of aid to Cuba, Soviet military assistance
efforts in the Western Hemisphere were extremely limited in scope and
number. In 1954, after repeated attempts to gain assistance from the
89 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations. Hearings
for FY 1963, p. 977.
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United States, Guatamala under the leadership of Jacobo Arbenz con-
cluded agreements to purchase an unreported quantity of arms from
Czechoslovakia. Approximately 1,900 tons of weapons, reportedly mainly
field and small arms equipment, were delivered to Guatamalan ports before
the Arbenz regime was forcibly overthrown.90 A second Soviet effort came
in 1956 when an offer of military purchase credits was extended to Ar-
gentinapurportedly in an attempt to divert Argentina from further
purchases of British equipment.91 Although the offer was rejected, the
nature of the proposed Soviet program was significant. Credits were to
be extended for the purchase - at lower-than-production costs - of a
TU-104 jet transport and an undisclosed number of MIG-15 jet fighters
and Il-28 turbojet bombers.
Soviet military assistance was first extended to Cuba during 1960.
The Castro government at this time was sorely pressed for the armaments
necessary to equip its remobilized army and militia groups. Stocks of
U.S. equipment stored by the Batista regime had been exhausted; the
steadily deteriorating state of Cuban-U.S. relations as well as Cuba's
growing dependence on Soviet economic assistance gave little promise of
immediate or future U.S. military assistance or of the lifting of the U.S.
embargo on private shipments. Arms purchases from various European nations
90 Mecham, op. cit., p. 446.
91 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program:
Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Study No. 8 (The Council for Economic
and Industry Research, Inc.) Foreign Assistance Activities 6f the Communist
Bloc and Their Implications for the United States. (Washington, 1957),p. T15.
were no longer possible since Cuba had been unable to pay for earlier
purchases.
Substantive offers of military assistance were made first to Raoul
Castro during his visits to bloc countries in July, 1960. According to
best reports, at this time the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia offered
to provide Cuba with unspecified but "substantial" quantities of MIG
fighters, heavy Stalin tanks, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, ar-
tillery pieces, and light field weapons in addition to the standard pro-
gram for training equipment and military technicians. 9 2 After the rapid
acceptance of these offers shipments began in the late summer of 1960
and increased in frequency after new pledges of Soviet military support
for Cuba. By December 1960 bloc countries had shipped appoximately
28,000 tons of military equipment, valued at $50 million or more, in-
cluding "sufficient" equipment to outfit and support the newly-increased
45,000 man armed forces and 200,000 man militia. 9 3
Equipment shipments to Cuba continued in the same pattern through-
out 1961 and the first months of 1962, with only some fluctuations in
frequency. Major changes, however, occurred in the spring of 1962 when
the first Soviet missiles arrived in Cuba, followed by substantial
numbers of MRB' s and smaller surface-to-air missiles.9 4
92 Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 268.
93 Ibid. p. 270.
Reports in The New York Times from February 1963 to the present,
especially April 20, 1964 and June 27, 1964.
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The supply of more conventional weapons was also increased, largely in
the form of anti-aircraft guns, medium and heavy tanks, and field
artillery. The ranks of Soviet "advisers" and "technicians" were also
expanded, estimates of their total strength ranging between 17,000 and
22,000 men.
The developments of October 1962 need little comment here except
to note that Soviet technicians/troops seem to have been in exclusive
control of all 500 or more Nike-type missiles, the major portion of the
3,000 anti-aircraft guns, the 100 or more MIG fighters, and the 90 or
more helicopters.9 5 Throughout the crisis and its aftermath, the in-
volvement of Cuban forces, save on the highest levels, seems to have
been minimal.
The precise nature and direction of present Soviet military assis-
tance to Cuba is unclear. No further substantial arms shipments have
been reported since January, 1963, and there are reliable indications
that significant quantities of the more sophisticated weapons, includ-
advanced missile-radar systems and some missiles, have been removed.96
The level of Soviet forces has been reduced gradually over the past
eighteen months; a recent report estimated that soon only a permanent
training mission of 100 men will remain.9 7 Although there has been specu-
lation that Cuban forces have or soon will assume operation of the 24
Ibid., August 5, 1963
96 Ibid., April 20, 1964.
9 Ibid., June 27, 1963.
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anti-aircraft missile bases, the nature of present control arrange-
ments is still not publicly known.98
Even less information is available about the supply of military
equipment and support from Cuba or through Cuba to other revolutionary
groups in Latin America. Such Soviet-sponsored aid has been reported to
take two major forms: covert material support, largely financial in
nature; and special training in guerrilla warfare and subversion tactics,
either in special Cuban camps or in the Soviet Union. 9 9 With several
notable exceptions, little direct equipment aid is said to have been ex-
tended since most armament needs for revolutionary activity can be readily
filled on the open market in most Latin American countries.
The most widely publicized case of Cuban "revolutionary export"
has been that to Venezuela. 1 00 Reportedly, from 1960-1963, more than
200 Venezuelans received special revolutionary training in Cuba, most
being members of the Venezuelan Communist Party or of the revolutionary
leftist movement of Venezuela. The Betancourt government has repeatedly
charged that the recurring terrorist campaigns have been directed and fi-
nanced from Cuba. Perhaps the most spectactular evidence of Cuban involve-
ment was the discovery of a large cache of rifles, mortars, and submachine
98
Ibid.
9 9 E. Y. Berry, "Subversion and Hemispheric Stability," Yale Politi-
cal Review, April 1963, p. 34; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 403.
100 Report of the Investigating Committee Appoitted by the Council of
the Organization of American States, Acting Provisionally as Organ of
Consultation, Document OAE/Ser. G/IV, C-i-658, February 1, 1964, pp. 10-34.
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guns on a Venezuelan beach just before the December 1963 Presidential
elections.101
Other instances of covert assistance and training have not been
definitively reported in the public media. Some accounts indicate
that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons from all over Latin America received
special training in Cuba during 1962. There have also been some indi-
cations of Cuban involvement in the 1963 disturbances in Peru--reports
of some Czech-made weapons and of the delivery of Cuban monies to the
insurgents by courier.
Other Military Assistance
A third major element in the level of Latin American armament is
the substantial quantity of equipment sold to the Republics by the Euro-
pean states. Although not strictly considered under the heading of
military assistance, these sales have often been made at reduced costs
and have been concerned with modern equipment not available from the
United States.
The largest source of military sales to Latin America has been the
United Kingdom. British sales agreements have been concluded at various
times with most of the Republics but have been most frequent with Argen-
tina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Between 1950 and 1959 these
countries purchaded a total of 114 Meteor jet fighters and Camberra jet
bombers, and some 25 odd naval vessels, including two aircraft carriers.0 2
101. Ibid.
102 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 393.
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Coordination of British sales policy with U.S. assistance policies
has been slight and at times non-existent. In 1954, at the height of
the Guatamalan crisis, British arms were sold and delivered to the
Arbenz regime. A similar situation prevailed with respect to sales
to Batista during the summer and fall of 1958. Sales to Cuba continued
until early 1960, when the United States brought substantial pressure to
bear on the United Kingdom and effected the halt of the delivery of
fifteen jet fighters promised to the Castro government.1 0 3
Other major arms-selling nations have been Italy, France, Sweden, and
Belgium. On the whole, however, these countries have made only commer-
cial agreements and have not offered significant price reductions.
IV
The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Africa
Military assistance to Africa constitutes the most recent and in some
ways the least significant component of all military aid to the developing
areas. Paralleling the pattern of African political development, extensive
assistance efforts did not begin until the late 1950's and have attained
substantial scope only during the last three years. In contrast to pro-
grams in the Middle East and Latin America the quantity of aid has been
quite limited in terms both of the amounts extended to the region as a
103 Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 269.
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whole and of the sums received by the various African states. Further,
in general, the end items and training service furnished have not been
of a large-scale or highly sophisticated nature; smaller, conventional
ground and support equipment have been the major elements in all assis-
tance allocations.
In many respects, however, military assistance to the African
states has had consequences far more important and far-reaching than con-
siderations of scale and duration would suggest, for the eagerness of the
African states to acquire arms as a mark of their nationhood and to
achieve regional prominence (as well as to enhance their general inter-
national position) has led to increasing foreign involvement in African
military affairs, with at least ten nations providing equipment or training
assistance. Although relatively low in comparison to other regions, the
resulting level of armament had had a profound impact on the African poli-
tical balance, affecting not only the course of various inter-nation
disputes and conflicts but also the outcome of internal political battles
and the revolutionary campaigns in the remaining colonial territories.
Within the limits of extremely restricted data, the following dis-
cussion of military assistance to Africa will focus on the aid provided
by four major "types" of donor nations. Most attention of necessity will
be given to the aid extended by the United States, the Soviet Union, Comm-
unist China, the Sino-Soviet blo., and the principal former metropoles,
the United Kingdom and France. Some note, however, will also be taken of
the activities of certain other nations, principally Belgium, West
Germany, Israel, Italy, and the United Arab Republic.
-67-
U.S. Military Assistance
By far the largest and most significant amounts of military assist-
ance tendered by a single nation appear to be those provided by the United
States. Data for a number of countries are too incomplete for exact com-
parison. Begun in 1953 with the extension of military aid to Ethiopia,
the U.S. program steadily increased in scope and magnitude so that by FY
1963 approximately $138 million had been appropriated for fifteen African
nations. This amounted, however, to only .004% of the U.S. global aid
program. (See Table I). The past two years, however, have witnessed a
slight reduction in U.S. efforts, due to the smaller number of states receiv-
ing immediate post-independence assistance, and more importantly, to an
amendment passed in 1963 placing a $25 million ceiling on direct equipment
aid to Africa.104 (See Tables I and X).
U.S. programs in Africa have differed from those in other areas in two
respects. From the very first, military aid was officially designated as
only for purposes of internal security and stability. This policy was further
emphasized in 1963 by a Congressional amendment declaring that military aid
not strictly needed for internal security functions was prohibited except in
the case of specific "Presidential determination," that is, unless the Presi-
dent explicitly stated such aid was vital to U.S. interests.10 5 Accordingly
the type of assistance extended has been generally in the form of small-scale
conventional equipment for ground and support forces. A typical fiscal year
104
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for F 1965, p. 407.
105
Ibid.
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Table X
FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA, FY 1962
(In Millions of Dollars)
Fixcd charges 5.1
Supply operations and
nutritional surveys 2.3
Training 2.8
Force maintenance 3.8
Spare parts 2.4
Attrition 1.0
Other consumables .4
Force improvemtent 21.5
Aircraft .9
Ships .6
Tanks, vehicles and weapons 5.
Missiles
Electr6nic and communications
equipment 1.3
Special programs 11.2
Other 2.0
Total 30.4
Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings
for FY 1963, p. 543.
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Table XI
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE TO
AFRICAN STATES, Fy 1950-1964
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)
Totals
FY 1950-1960
Congo(Lpville)
Dahomey
Ethiopia 37.116
Fy 1961
13.6
Ivory Coast
FY 1962
.104
11.734
classified
classified
Upper Volta
Area UndiE-
tributed
Country
Cameroun
Fy 1963
.284
Ghana
.037
3.378
Liberia
Libya
.054
11.349
.207
.152
.005
.120
3.645
.8
.7
.6Mali
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Tunisia
1.803
.721
.243
2.027
2.102
1.258
2.476
.049
.325
.515
.108
9.6
.046
16.759
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security
Program for FY 1961, p.22; International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual
Defense and Assistance Program for FY 1964, p.177.
ii.67o
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Table XII
U.S. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA STATES
(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)
FY 1958 FY 1959 Fr 1960 Fy 1961
Algeria
Cameroun
Congo (Lpville)
1.301
15.000 15.000
30.000 44.847
.650
.422 19.499
Tanganyika
Togo
15.000 20.085
Country FY 1962
Ethiopia
Guinea
Liberia
.334
1.912
1.919
2.369
4.765
2.997'
.177
Libya
.635
3.800
Mali
Morocco
Somalia
Sudan
.100
2.100
2.375
15.000
50.840
1.680
10.000
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
9.000
.399
30-000
.399
3.200
14.021
2.903
40.000
2.903
7.301
.341
.988
25.000Tunisia 20.000
.205
-300
10.000
Sources: International Cooperation Administration, T e Mutual Security
Program: Operations Report for Fys 1959-1961; International Development
Agency, The Mutual Security Program: Operations Report for FY 1963.
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breakdown is shown in Table X.
Within this general framework, however, there have been wide variances
in the nature and scope of the aid programs for particular countries. Per-
haps the most obvious difference is the substantially larger proportion of
total aid grants received by the North African states and Ethiopia. Although
a partial explanation lies in the fact that several of these nations have
been independent for a longer period, a far more crucial factor has been
the fact that each is or was the site of a major U.S. military or scientific
installation. The desire of the United States to secure continued access
to these bases has led to the provision not only of larger quantities of
assistance but also of more sophisticated military equipment and of more
extensive training and supervisory services.
Although all relevant data are classified, reports suggest that the
largest country programs have been those extended to Morocco and Tunisia,
from the time of independence in 1956. Assistance to Morocco, the site
until recently of four U.S. air bases and a naval communications center,
has constituted the greater proportion and has been characterized by two
distinct phases. Frorm 1956 to Fy 1959, only special supporting
106
These bases were established in the immediate postwar period under
base rights agreements negotiated with France. Upon attainment of Moroccan
independence, these were re-negotiated for a seven-year period, scheduled
for termination at the end of 1963. In 1960, however, U.S.-Moroccan agree-
ment was reached to return one of the bases to Morocco at that time.
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assistance was tendered; under the terms of the renegotiated base agree-
ments Morocco received more than $90 million in aid.1 0 7
In 1959-60 an additional program of direct military aid was ini-
tiated, focused mainly on the provision of small arms and motor vehicles
for ground-force use. Under the impact of changing Moroccan-U.S. rela-
tions and the extension of Soviet military assistance, however, the
nature of U.S. efforts underwent significant revision. The direct aid
appropriation for FY 1963 was greater than the total of all previous end-
item and training allocations and provided for the granting of a number I
of jet and conventional aircraft and increased pilot training services.l08
The-nature of present and future U.S. military aid to Morocco is
somewhat unclear. Although past Congressional and press discussions in-
dicated that large-scale U.S. assistance would terminate with final
base-withdrawal on December 31, 1963, Morocco is still receiving aid,
being designated in the FY 1965 proposals as one of the African states
that must be aided in order to preserve a "free world orientation."1 0 9
The only public data available refer to supporting assistance; there are,
however, indications of continuing equipment aid as well. Moreover, a
107 International Cooperation Administration, The Mutual Security
Program: Operations Report, June 30, 1960.
108 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings
for Fy 1963, p. 567.
109 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings FY 1965, p. 86.
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U.S. pilot training mission is still in Morocco and reportedly will
remain for an indefinite period.1 10
U.S. military assistance to Tunisia has been far more limited
in scope and has been chiefly in the form of ground equipment. Al-
though both programs were begun at the same time, the nature of the U.S.
commitment in Tunisia was and in many respects still is significantly
different. According to reports, assistance initially was granted with
considerable reluctance and under threats by President Bourguiba to turn
to "other" sources for desired arms. 1 1 1 Despite certain difficulties
with respect to Algeria and the Bizerte incidents, significant amounts
of equipment and supporting assistance were furnished through FY 1962.
The last two years, however, have seen a gradual phasing-out of all but
limited training programs, supporting assistance being terminated in
FY 1964 and equipment programs in FY 1965.
The beneficiary of the largest amount of U.S. assistance has been
Ethiopia, the locale of an important U.S. communications base. Since
the signature of an MDA treaty in 1953 the government of Hailie Selassie
has been extended a highly diversified program of equipment and
training aid, the most varied of all the U.S. military assistance program
in Africa. During the first phases assistance efforts focused primarily
110
The New York Times, October 20, 1963
111 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 63.
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on the modernization and mobilization of the small Ethiopian Army.
In later years additional grants or interest-free loans have been pro-
vided for the acquisition of a number of small naval vessels and a
few modern aircraft including some F-86 jet fighters.1 1 2 Supporting
assistance to Ethiopia also has been relatively extensive.
Libya has also been a major recipient of U.S. military assist-
ance to Africa. U.S. efforts have stemmed not only from the agree-
ment concerning Wheelus air base concluded in 1954 but also from
certain British-U.S. guarantees offered upon Libya's attainment of
independence in 1951. Both direct military aid primarily for ground
forces and substantial quantities of supporting and budgetary assist-
ance have been extended.
Assistance to two other states, Liberia and the Sudan, has been
similar in purpose though not in extent to that tendered these four
states. In Liberia the United States maintains Roberts air base and
has a strategic interest in the port of Monrovia, improved and enlarged
by U.S. forces and funds. Direct military aid did not begin until after
the conclusion of an MDA agreement in 1959 and has largely been in the
form of ground equipment and some small naval craft. A U.S. training
112I
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for Ft 1963,
p. 566. It is perhaps revealitg to note that U.S. military assistance to
Ethiopia has been one of the most vehemently attacked aspects of the total
foreign aid program. Perhaps the most tenacious critic has been Repre-
sentative Otto Passman of Louisiana who has uncovered the use of the
7-86's to frighten recalcitrant Ethiopian tribesmen and the expendi-
ture of $3.1 million to convert a seaplane tender into a personal yacht-
flagship for the Emperor. Ibid.
-75-
mission is also in residence and has begun to assist in the execution
of "civic faction" programs.
The Sudan has received relatively large amounts of special support-
ing assistance in return for the granting of over-fly rights and
landing privileges at Khartouma. Little direct military aid has been
tendered since such assistance has been furnished by the United Kingdom.
As in all of the "base support" states, the U.S. supporting program is
being phased down and replaced with more direct development assistance.
Military assistance to the states, of sub-Saharan Africa has been
extremely limited in nature and scope. Official pronouncements have re-
peatedly emphasized that the primary needs of these states are economic
not military and have stressed U.S. opposition to increased armament
levels and the development of intra-regional arms races. Also, despite
repeated African requests, the United States has steadfastly maintained
that the main responsibility for free-world military assistance to Africa
rests with the former metropole states, principally Britain and France.
U.S. programs are conceived of as being "primarily designed to manifest
U.S. interest in helping to maintain law and order in volatile situations
which threaten the stability of the emerging nations." 3
The specific states to which the United States extends assistance
fall into three broad categories, the characteristics of each having
113
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 59.
obvious impact upon the extent of aid efforts. The first group are
those nations still receiving substantial quantities of military training
and equipment aid from their former metropoles, specifically certain of
the newer Commonwealth states, many of the French Community members and
associates, and the Congo Republic (Leopoldville). Equipment and
supporting assistance to this group has been largely supplementary in
nature and has been relatively closely coordinated with metropole programs.
Ghana and Nigeria exemplify the second category, states that have found
metropole aid to be unwelcome or too limited. The United States still
provides limited amounts of direct equipment aid to Nigeria; assistance
to Ghana ended during FY 1964.
U.S. policy toward the third class of states, the major recipients
of Soviet or Chinese Communist arms credits, has varied. Guinea has been
granted supporting assistance, but has been refused direct military aid;
Mali has received large quantities of equipment and training help for civic
action programs as well as increasing support aid. U.S. aid was not
offered to the revolutionary government of Zanzibar; the offer rejected
by Somalia has not been renewed.
Almost without exception the type of equipment and training assist-
ance provided has been for the development of small ground forces to
meet minimal defense requirements. End items furnished have been re-
ported to be principally light weapons, motor vehicles, electronic and
and communications equipment, and small quantities of liaison helicopter
-6
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and transport aircraft. 11 Requests for more sophisticated weapons
have been repeatedly and often denied. To cite only one example, when
Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa in 1961 asked for the grant of a jet
fighter squadron, Secretary of State Rusk stressed the unsuitability of
such equipment for Nigerian defense needs and pointed out that the
cost of such a squadron and its annual maintenance approached, if not
equalled, the cost of educating five million Nigerians.15
Special mention must be made of U.S. military assistance to the
Congo both before and after the withdrawal of UNOC forces. Under the
Adoula plan of 1963, the United States has provided only transport and
communications materiel and training. Particular emphasis has been
placed on air transport equipment, including helicopters, C-4T7's, and
rocket-equipped T-28 fighter bombers. At the request of the Congolese
government, the United States has also undertaken the re-equipping of
6 Army battalions, and of the Congolese Police Force, the latter at an
estimated cost of $538,000.116
Sino-Soviet Military Assistance
In comparison with that extended by the other major donor nations
Sino-Soviet military assistance toward Africa has been relatively
111 Ibid., p. 1065.
115 Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (Chicago, 1963), p. 40.
116 The New York Times, February 19, 1964, March 25, 1964,
April 30, 1964.
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limited in scope and magnitude. Africa as a whole did not become an
important focus of bloc aid activities until 1958; military assistance
did not constitute a significant component of bloc programs until the
early 1960's.
The past several years, have witnessed a significant increase in
Sino-Soviet efforts. Direct equipment and training help has now been
extended to at least eight states and several revolutionary groups.
Current reports estimate that total bloc assistance has exceeded $60
million, more than double the estimates given in 1960.117 Much of this
increase, however, can be attributed to the Chinese-Soviet split which has
seriously affected the effectiveness of the Communist effort in Africa.
Sino-Soviet efforts in Africa have been quite similar to those in the
other two regions, with only slight differences in emphasis. Assistance
has been tendered to those states that have been denied Western aid or
have become dissatisfied with the amount received. The largest propor-
tion of assistance has been concentrated in several key states. Such
saturation efforts have been designed not only (or principally) to develop
client states but more importantly to provide dramatic examples of Soviet
generosity and interest.
117
Ibid., July 6, 1964. See also U.S. Congress, House of Repre-
sentatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Appropriations, Hearings for FY 1962, p. 491; and U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1963,
p. 215.
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Further, the form of bloc aid has remained the same. Although re-
latively more "gifts" of arms have been provided, most assistance has
been in the form of credits repayable in raw materials or foodstuffs
at a low rate of interest. Significant amounts of economic and technical
assistance usually have accompanied or preceeded direct military help and
have often been allocated for quasi-military or "supporting" projects.
In Northern Africa, Morocco and Algeria have been major benefic-
iaries of Soviet equipment and training aid. Under a bilateral agreement
concluded in 1961, Morocco received a number of MIG fighters and other
advanced equipment, as well as extensive technical and training assist-
ance. Since the deterioration of Moroccan-Soviet relations, first over
Mauritania, and then over the Algerian border conflict, no new arms
shipments or agreements have been reported.
Soviet aid to Algeria has been more extensive in nature and more
continuous in duration. Soviet-made equipment was consistently supplied
to the Algerian rebels in their struggle for independence, most frequently
via the UAR. In the post-independence period, a bilateral arms agreement
was concluded, reportedly involving the provision of six MIG fighters,
five helicopters, and substantial quantities of ground arms and equipment. 8
During the last six months of 1963, however, Soviet assistance to
Algeria reached a new peak. During the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute,
118 The New York Times, October 27, 1963.
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Soviet tanks, planes, artillery, trucks, and communication equipment
reached Algeria by way of both Cuba and the UAR. Although there was only
informed speculation as to direct Soviet involvement, the degree of Soviet
interest was revealed by the fact that Algeria was one of the three
major recipients of the $3 million in new Soviet aid reported from June
to December 1963. No further arms deliveries, however, have been re-
ported as of the date of this report. 1 1 9
Of the sub-Saharan countries, Guinea has been the focus of the great-
est and most concerted bloc assistance efforts. Military credits, chiefly
Czech and Soviet, have been furnished under agreements concluded in 1958
and 1960, following Guinea's refusal to join the French Community and
its failure to secure arms from the United States. Assistance has taken
several forms. Over $1 million in direct equipment supplies has been
provided, comprised chiefly of ground weapons and vehicles for Guinea's
3,300 man armed forces but with a limited number of MIG 17 jet fighters
and transports, and some other larger-scale equipment.1 2 0 Substantial
training and military-technical projects also have been carried on by the
relatively large cadres of bloc technicians. Further aid with military
implications has been for the construction of a civil airport and for
the development of a national airline.
119 Ibid.
120 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
The Sino-Soviet Offensive (Intelligence Report No. 8426) (Washington,
1961).
Moreover, in the past Sino-Soviet aid has been channeled by and
through Guinea to the rebellious forces in the Republic of Cameroun. 1 2 1
Although available data are limited, reports indicate that these forces
received not only direct arms aid but also special training in Guinea
itself from both bloc and Guinean instructors. To cite but one example,
in 1962 the U.S. Department of State alleged that at least one faction
of the U.P.C. forces engaged in terrorist activity in Southwest Cameroun
had received terrorist and gueirla trainirg from Chinese Communist tech-
122
nicians based in Guinea.
At present the future of Sino-Soviet aid to Guinea remains somewhat
in doubt. The deterioration of Guinean-bloc relations has led to a sig-
nificant curtailment in all assistance efforts and the withdrawal of a
number of technical advisers. No new arms shipments have been reported
in a period of over two years and none now seem expected. The country's
partial rapproche.-ent with the West and the increasing amcunts of Western
economic and supporting aid received would seem to indicate that Guinea
now is seeking more diversified sources of assistance.
Quite similar to saturation efforts in Guinee. was the brief program
of bloc military assistance extended to the forces of Patrice Lumumba
121 Rivkin, op, cit., p. 95.
122 Cited in McKay, op. -,cit., p. 205.
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during the first stages of Congolese independence. 1 2 3 Direct aid, parti-
cularly during the Kasai campaign, was provided in the form of ground
and air transport services and equipment, some quantities of "small
arms, " and the "advisory" efforts of a number of bloc technicians. More
indirect and limited assistance was reported to have been given by Czech
officers and technicians serving with the Guinean component of the United
Nations force.124 All formal bloc efforts in the Congo, however, were
terminated after Lumumba's capture and imprisonment. There have been
numerous allegations of Sino-Soviet assistance first to the Gizenga regime
in Stanleyville by way of the UAR and now to Pierre Mulele and the rebels
of Kwilu and Kivu.
Perhaps of greatest current importance is bloc assistance to
Somalia and the role it is playing in the Republic's recent border dis-
putes with Kenya and Ethiopia. At the outbreak of hostilities, Somalia
appealed to the Western nations for assistance, and received an offer
of $10-15 million from a consortium of the United States, West Germany,
and Italy, on the condition that Somalia accept aid from no other source.
Dissatisfied, Somalia then requested Soviet assistance sufficient to
train, equip, and field a 20,000-man army. The Soviet Union extended a
reported $30 million in arms credits, and arranged for training in
123 Discussion of background in King Gordon, U.N. in the Congo
(New York, 1962), pp. 52-58.
124 Rivkin, op. cit., pp. 95, 209-10.. 
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Moscow for 65-90 Somali army officers.125 Deliveries, however, have been
extremely slow and mainly in the form of small items.126
There have also been some scattered indications of Chinese Communist
involvement in Somalian military affairs. Early in 1963, a Chinese
military mission was established in Mo dishu and reportedly furnished
training in guerrilla tactics and strategy.127 Although at the time of
this writing there have been no reports of direct equipment aid, a number
of the Chinese-supported development projects are of potential military
significance and several interest-free loans have been extended to under-
write Somalian expenditures during the border conflict.128
Although far more limited in scale, Sino-Soviet assistance to Zanzi-
bar is also of contempory significance. Even before the overthrow of the
Sultanate, Zanzibari rebels received bloc equipment and training, several
of the revolutionary leaders having been trained in guerrilla warfare in
Cuba. 99 During the period between the revolt and union with Tanganyika,
the new government concluded military aid agreements with both the Soviet
bloc (through East Germany) and the Chinese Communists. Reports indicate
125
The New York Times, November 11, 1963, March 16, 1964,
126
Ibid., July 6, 1964.
127
The Christian Science Monitor, August 27, 1963.
128
The New York Times, January 20, 1964
129
Ibid.., April 27, 1964.
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that the Soviets have supplied trucks, artillery, mortars, and anti-
aircraft guns, while the Chinese have delivered substantial quantities
of automatic weapons, including submachine guns.130 Both have also
sent teams of weapons technicians and military instructors, reportedly
more than 30 in number.
With respect to bloc programs in the remaining areas, the Sudan,
Mali, Ghana, and the Angolan rebelsvery little specific information has
been publicly reported. After rejecting an offer of bloc assistance in 1956
the Sudan concluded an arms agreement in 1959 and by the end of FY 1961 had
received somewhat less than $1 million in military aid.131 Bloc military
assistance to Mali reportedly has been on a considerably smaller scale
and has been comprised mainly of small field equipment. Under the economic
and technical aid program, however, Mali has received some relatively
modern aircraft, reportedly twenty in all.
Ghana has been tendered perhaps the largest total quantity of
direct and indirect military aid. Equipment aid has been relatively
varied in nature and has included a number of newer Soviet-produced air-
craft. Development funds have been committed to the construction of a
major shipyard and to the development of the national airline, Ghana
Airways Corporation.132 Recently some dissatisfaction has been voiced
130 Ibid., April 27, 1964, June 15, 1964.
131 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
The Sino-Soviet Offensive, op. cit.
132 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Comm-
ittee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for
FY 1962, p. 419.
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with respect to the quality and operation of certain types of equipment
acquired from the bloc. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this was the
fact that in August of 1963 the Soviet Union agreed to take back at
no cost four of the eight Ilyushin-18 planes provided to the Ghanian
Air Force in 1960.133
Metropole Military Assistance
The second largest component of military assistance to Africa has
been that provided by the three former colonial powers, Britain, France,
and Belgium. Most of this aid has been concentrated in the sub-Saharan
region, in states that although now independent, have retained military
and police ties with their former metropoles. All three nations have
extended both direct military, particularly training, aid and some mili-
tary-tinged supporting assistance.
Of the three, British military assistance has been the most diver-
sified and the best publicized. British aid in a sense predates the
emergence of independent African states; to a greater degree than the
other metropoles the United Kingdom equipped and trained native forces
in all of its dependencies, particularly those on the eve of statehood.
At present, in addition to efforts in the semi-dependent countries and
remaining colonial possessions, military assistance is accorded to two
133 The New York Times, August 25, 1963.
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broad classes of states, African Commonwealth members and nations in
which the United Kingdom has long-standing strategic interests.
The largest proportion of British military assistance has been ex-
tended to the independent Commonwealth states, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. Although there have been signifi-
cant differences in nature and scope, the general pattern of assistance
has remained the sane. After the grant of independence each has received
substantial quantities of equipment and training aid to strengthen new
national forces. Barring political difficulties, assistance efforts on
a somewhat reduced scale have been continued. Whatever the state of
relations with Britain, however, each retains the Commonwealth privilege
of sending officers to British military and staff training colleges.
Ghana, the first British colony in Africa to attain independence, re-
ceived substantial assistance until 1961. Together with Canada, the
United Kingdom equipped, trained, and provided operating cadres for
Ghana's reorganized ground forces and new jet air force. 1 3 5 In 1959
some small naval craft were transferred by Britain: several mine-
sweepers, seaward defense boats, and corvettes. British and Canadian
officers also held key positions in the Ghanaian armed forces during this
period.
134 Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 229-30.
135 Ritvin, op. cit., p. 98; equipment details in S. H. Stein-
berg (ed.) The Statesman's Yearbook: 1962-3 (New York, 1962), p. 516.
=ago W W Ai 4 Owl W A WK if
Table XIII
BRITISH MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES, FY 1959-1964
(in thousands of pounds)
Fy 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Ghana not reported
Nigeria 500 500 not reported
Sierra not reported
Leone
Tanganyika 200.
Uganda 220. 30
Com. Milit.
Aid: Total 168.5 332.5 681.5 1,682
Libya 23 177 41.8 94.5 107. 79
Sudan 402 135 50.8 6oo. 60. 13
Somalia 60. 250. 100
Mali 80.
Milit. Assistance 70. 95. 98.5 118.0
(general)
Sources: House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates
for FYs 1959-1964, II.
k ui 1 4i %. 10 j. -4f, 4 - a 10 1 -M vpv
Table XIV
BRITISH GRANTS-IN-AID TO AFRICAN STATES
(in thousands of pounds)
FY 1959 1960 1961 1962
not reported
867
Sierra Leone
Tanganyika
900
1,500
1,733
1,013.7
1,000.
4,567.
874.
3,250
700
3,250
684
3,250
1,200
3,250
1,450
3,250.
1,100.
103.0
500.
1,900.
895.
3,250.
1,225.
Sources: House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates
for FYs 1959-1964, II.
m - m em -e -am m- -m - m
Ghana
Nigeria
1963 1964
Uganda
Libya
Somalia
I
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The deterioration of British-Ghanaian relations and Ghana's de-
cision to seek other sources of arms aid has had a significant effect
upon British aid efforts. Although detailed public information is mini-
mal, reports indicate that direct British and Canadian aid is now con-
siderably more limited in extent and nature. Some training activity is
still carried on by Canada, but all foreign officers were replaced by
Ghandan nationals in 1961.136 Supporting assistance for military purposes
is also said to have been reduced.
Somewhat similar difficulties have marked recent military aid to
Nigeria. During its final steps toward independence Nigeria received re-
latively substantial amounts of equipment, training, and force support
grants. In 1960 a mutual defense agreement was signed providing inter alia
for an enlarged direct assistance program, particularly with respect to
the new Nigerian air force. Popular opposition and political pressures,
however, led finally to the termination of the agreement in January,
1962.137 Some limited British assistance has continued, primarily in
the form of specialized training and some sales arrangements.
British assistance continues to the newer Commonwealth states,
Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. Little has been reported
concerning the exact nature and extent of this aid; presumably it has
been subsumed under the heading of Commonwealth military assistance
136 Steinberg, op. cit., p. 109; The New York Times, July 30,
1963.
137 John Holmes, "The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence
of Africa," International Organization, Spring 1962, p. 294.
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and has been similar to that first tendered Ghana and Nigeria. Kenya,
for example, requested and received immediate post-independence aid to
expand its army and establish a small air force and navy.138 Revolts
in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya also occasioned more direct British in-
volvement, British troops and equipment being deployed at the request of
the three governments.1 3 9
Note also should be made of British aid policy to a former Common-
wealth member, the Union of South Africa. Although direct aid was extended
only with respect to the Simonstown base agreement, British sales to
South Africa from 1945-1963 were of substantial magnitude, second only
in recent years to those of France. The past year, however, has seen
a significant shift in British sales policy. Pressured by the African
members of the Commonwealth and by unilateral U.S. action, Britain
supported a Security Council resolution of December, 1963 calling upon
all states to establish an embargo on all equipment that could be
used to manufacture arms. To many observers, this constituted implicit
support for an earlier Security Council appeal with respect to all
military shipments to South Africa.14o
Extensive military assistance has been provided to three non-
Commonwealth states, Libya, the Sudan, and Somalia, all nations with long-
138 The New York Times, March 21, 1964.
139 Ibid., January 25, 1964.
14o Ibid., December 6, 1963.
standing British military ties. Of the three, the Sudan, formerly a
British protectorate and still a member of the sterling area, has
received the largest quantities of direct equipment and training assist-
ance. Through grants and low-cost sales, particularly in 1961,
Sudanese forces have been equipped with a number of jet aircraft, armored
vehicles, and ground transports as well as conventional small arms and
field equipment. 14 British officers and technicians have conducted
numerous training and military-technical programs.
The United Kingdom's efforts in Libya date from the establishment
of British bases before independence and since 1951 have been closely
coordinated with those of the United States. Heavy emphasis has been
placed on the training of officers and enlisted men: at least 14O,000
has been appropriated annually for British training missions since 1961.142
Direct equipment aid ias been primarily a U.S. responsibility, with
Britain contributing some supplementary materiel for graund and naval
forces. Somewhat greater sharing has been effected with respect to budge-
tary support; since 1959 the United Kingdom has granted L3,250,000
annually for this purpose.
Somalia, composed in part of the former colony of British Somali-
land, also received quantities of military aid and some military-tinged
141 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 94.
142 House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and
Civil Estimates for FY 1959-1964, II.
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supporting assistance in the immediate post-independence period. Very
little is known about the nature of this assistance except that it now has
been terminated. I
British assistance to other African states has been quite limited
in scope and has been included under general appropriation for military
assistance and training. Only one direct allocation has been reported
in the recent past: in FY 1962 L80,000 was appropriated to cover the
cost of a "gift of aircraft" to Mali.
Due to the almost total lack of information, only general comments
can be ventured concerning French military assistance in Africa. France's
recent efforts have been second only to those of the United States in
scope; at present military ties exist between France and thirteen African
states. As was the case with recipients of British aid, all of the
nations formerly were French colonial dependencies.
The specific nature of the military arrangements has varied accord-
ing to the status of political relations with France. The seven full
members of the Community have received perhaps the most extensive aid,
providing for full equipment and training and often the direct services
of French commissioned and non-commissioned officers.145 Under bilateral
143 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 90.
144 House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts for
FY 1962, II, p. 8.
145 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 99.
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agreements concluded in March 1961 the four Entente states also have
received not only economic and cultural assistance but also military
aid for the establishment of their armed forces.146 Republic of
Cameroun and Togo have been tendered assistance under special agreements
made in 1960.
Only fragmentary data exists concerning the specific direction of
French military aid programs. The framework of the general Union Afri-
caine et Malgache and of the more limited Central African Defense
Council seemed at one time to provide for a loose system of mutual
1147defense assistance supported by French cooperation and advisory services.
One member state, Mauritania, has received increasing amounts of French
assistance in consequence of its dispute with Morocco. Assistance
to the Republic of Cameroun has been oriented particularly toward the
requirements of defense against recurrent terrorist attacks launched by
rebel forces based in and aided by Guinea.
A similar information problem exists with respect to Belgium's
principal military aid program, that to the Congo. The history of past
Belgian private and semi-public aid during the Congo crisis is as yet
not totally clear and is still far too tangled to permit more than a
116 Ruth C. Lawson, ed., International Regional Organizations,
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general note. Since the final unification of the Congo Belgium reportedly
has supplied some quantities of direct aid as one of two nations requested
to render training assistance, plans to provide some 200 military instruc-
tors in the next two years. I
Other Military Assistance
Five other countries--West Germany, the United Arab Republic, Italy,
Israel, and India--have provided military assistance to one or more
African states. Although their efforts have been relatively limited in
comparison to those of the major donor powers, they have had a not in-
considerable impact on the level of African armament and military
activity.
Of the longest duration have been the military assistance programs
of Egypt. Principal recipients of this aid have been the neighboring
North African states or groups, with the largest proportion being extended
to the Algerian rebels both before and after independence. From the
very beginnings of the movement Egypt provided direct equipment aid to
these forces and established special training courses at its military
colleges for rebel officers and men. 1 5 0 Egyptian efforts also helped
secure financial grants from the Arab League, that granted October 1958
totaling L E 12 million. During the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, Egyptian
troops and equipment were furnished on an emergency basis.1 51  Small
149 The New York Times, August 25, 1963, March 25, 1964.
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amounts of military assistance have also been provided at various times
to Tunisia and Libya, the latter in 1959 receiving a limited quantity of
air-training equipment and services.1 52
The nature and extent of Egyptian assistance to other African
states is relatively unknown. Some assistance was accorded the Sudan
during the Egyptian campaign to bring that country within its sphere of
political influence. Somalia has received direct equipment aid, dating
from the period before independence. Reports also have indicated UAR
assistance to the Gizenga regime and past aid offers to the various Casa-
blanca states under the now moribund plan to establish a joint military
high command. 1 5 3
The Federal Republic of Germany recently has undertaken a rather
extensive program of military assistance for seven Africal states, Nigeria,
the Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, the Ialagasy Republic, Ethiopia, and Libya.154
According to a recent statement all have requested aid to reduce dependence
on assistance from the former metropoles and the United States; West
Germany, however, has consulted with its NATO allies concerning each
request and has operated "always in agreement with the former colonial
power and with the United States."
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Assistance, budgeted for about $10 million in 1963, has taken
several forms. 1 5 5 Training missions have been established in each
country, the largest mission being established in Nigeria where reported-
ly seventy West German instructors and technicians were assisting in the
build-up of Nigerian air forces. Some African officers have been brought
to West Germany for specialized instruction, most notably pilots from
Nigeria and naval officers from the Malagasy Republic. Certain of the
seven aided states have also received arms credits for the purchase of
weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment in West Germany.
Italian assistance has been extremely limited in scope and magni-
tude. Together with the United States and Western Germany, Italy offered
assistance to Somalia in 1963 and was the only one of the three states
to have its offer accepted.156 In May, 1964 Italy concluded arrangements
for its participation in the Adoula plan, and pledged training and equip-
ment aid for the Congolese air force.1 5 7
The assistance tendered by India and Israel has been limited to
technical training services. Israel has established pilot training
schools in Ghana and Cameroun, and has provided para-commando and medical
155 The Baltimore Sun, June 13, 1963.
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training to the Congolese.158 Reports have also indicated that some
of Holden Roberto's Angolan forces have received medical training in
Israel.1 5 9 India has provided flight instructors and training equipment
to both Ethiopia and Ghana.160
158 Ibid., March 25, 1964.
159
Ibid., December 16, 1963
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